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1.

r

Cert to CA 6
(Brown; Edwards [CJ],
conchlrring; Jones,
~ing; Lively,
~iss~~~ing i
Merritt, dissenting;
Kennedy, d i sse~g
Federal/Civi
(Habe s)

~
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Cert to CA 6
(Merritt,
Brown & Martin)
Federal/Civil (Habeas)

v.

ENGLE

Cert to CA 6
(Kennedy,
Martin & Phillips;
order)
Federal/Civil (Habeas)

1.
relief

-

~~

Timely

PERINI,
Superi

\..___-

~A.s

SUMMARY:

Timely

Whether resps were barred from federal habeas

under~ inwright

v.

~ke~

by Ohio's contemporaneous

objection rule, when they failed to object to jury instructions
placing on them the burden of proof on the issue of self-defense.

-22.

BACKGROUND:

These a re

~~~ons~
ca~
..,

Each

resp was indicted for a criminal offense in Ohio and each was
found guilty of a lesser included offense after a jury trial.
each case, the resp relied upon the affirmative
defense.
__,.

defens~ ~ f

In

self-

In each case no objection was entered to the trial
'--

court's jury instruction that the defendant bore the burden of

---------~--------------------------proof on self-defense by a preponderance of the evidence.

--->

-~ ~

Sentencing for ~~j i ~nd each was sentenced to a
prison term.
Subsequent to their convictions, the Ohio Supreme Court
~

.._____

concluded

l ..

th~t

§2901.05(a)

solely

~a

m! tter

t(

-

g_f _st~

,,

law, O.R.C.

(effective January 1, 1974) changed the traditional

common-law rule that a defendant has the burden of proof by a

------ -- -------=--------·~--------·

p ~~~~~e~~ f. fir~~ dcle-nses.
new law, the defendant

Und ~: the ~-

has~ the ' h urden of coming forward withAu~.
'\

sufficient evidence to create an issue as to the affirmative
defense.

~

The Stat~ ' then has the burden of proving beyond a

/.., r-

-:r

~

~~

reasonable doubt the nonexistence of the affirmative defense. ~"
Stat~

v. Robinson, 47 Ohio St.2d 103 (1976).

In a subsequent

decision, State v. Humphries, 51 Ohio St.2d 95 (1977), the Ohio
Supreme Court held that although the interpretation of O.R.C.
§2901.05(a) reached in Robinson was fully applicable to all
trials conducted after January 1, 1974, a defendant who did not
object to the charge on that ba s is would be precluded from
relief.
Resp Isaac appealed his conviction, relying upon

Rob~nson.

The appellate court affirmed because he had failed to ob j ect to

-3-

the instruction.

The Ohio Sup. Ct. denied Isaac relief on the

same day that it decided Humphries.

Resps Bell and Hughes

appealed their convictions, but did not raise the issue of the
adequacy of the jury instructions on self-defense.

Subsequently

all three resps filed habeas petitions in Federal District Court
and in all three instances the courts denied relief.
the CA 6 subsequently voted to reverse

Isaac~.

A panel of

The majority of

the panel (Beck & Phillips) found that the Ohio Sup. Ct.'s
selective denial of the benefit of the Robinson decision was
itself arbitary and capricious and thus a denial of Due Process.
It did not consider the question of whether the instruction
itself violated Due Process.

Because the major thrust of petr's

claim was not directed at the constitutionality of the jury
instruction itself, but rather a1~he constitutionality of the
selective application of Robinson, Wainwright v. §3-kes was held
not to be applicable.

A rehearing en bane was granted.

Sometime during the proceedings in the courts below, Hughes
and Isaac were granted final releases as a matter of parole and
thus have served their sentences.
3.

Bell is still in prison.

DECISION BELOW:
Isaac:

Judge Brown, joined by Judges Weick, Keefe &

Martin, wrote the plurality opinion.

Judge Brown rejected the

approach of the CA 6 panel, which has focused on the arbitrary
and capricious nature of selective retroactivity:

"We believe

that the more appropriate focus is on the underlying claim, in
this case the constitutional validity of the jury instructions .
• • as considered in light of Robinson and Humohries."

On this

-4point, the threshold issue was \- 1hether or not the state
procedural rule effectively precludes federal habeas review.
Noting that the "cause" and "prejudice" standards of Wainwright
still remain "somewhat undefined," Judge Brown concluded that the
circumstances of this case sati s fied both standards.

"Cause" was

found in the fact that there wa s no indication at the time of
trial that the jury instruction s were contrary to state law: the
instructions were in accordance with well-established state law.
Because the burden of proof is a critical element of the factfinding process, prejudice was established by an error in the
allocation of that burden.

Having found that Isaac met the

criteria set forth in Wainwright, the plurality went on to

/

consider the substantive constitutional claim under Mullaney v.
Wilbur, 421
197 (1977).

u.s.

684 (1975), and

~tterson v. New York, 432 U.S.

The court read these cases to have held that while a

state is largely free to define crimes as it chooses,

~ ess

~

requires that it prove beyond a reasonable doubt the element s of
the crime as defined.
~

Although self-defense does not negate an

element of the crime involved here as defined by th e Ohio
statute, the plurality found "no practical difference between
requiring a state to prove the e lements of crimes beyond a
reasonable doubt and requiring it to meet

it~

assumed burden of

proving absence of affirmative defenses beyond a reasonable
doubt."

In effect, the plurali t y held that despite the language
I I
of the statute, the absence of s elf-defense is an element of the

-5-

Chief Judge Edwards .concurred in the result, but argued that
under In re WinshJE, 397 U.S. 358 (1970), and Mullaney the Due
Process Clause requires that the burden of proof of criminal
intent be placed on the prosecution.

In his view, criminal

intent of aggravated assault and self-defense are completely
irreconcilable.

Therefore, to require a defendant to carry the

burden of proof on self-defense is to require him to disprove
criminal intent.

He joined the plurality opinion on the

Wainwright issue.

Judge Jones concurred separately and seems to

rely primarily on the reasoning of the original panel decision.
Judge Lively dissented.

In his view Robinson did not place

the burden on the state of disproving affirmative defenses beyond
a reasonable doubt.

Judge Kennedy dissented, arguing that the

cause aftd prejudice exception of Wainwright does not apply in
this case.

He relied primarily on a footnote in Hankerson v .

.

North Carolina, 432 U.S. 233, 244 n. 8 (1977), which stated that:
"The states if they wish may be able to insulate
past convictions by enforcing the normal and
valid rule that failure to object to a jury
instruction is waiver of any claim of error."
In Hankerson, the Court held Mu l laney to be retroactive; it made
the above remark in the context of a discussion of the impact of
its decision on the administrat i on of justice.

In Judge

Kennedy's view, if a change in interpretation of the law provides
"cause" for a defendant's

failu ~ e

to object at trial sufficient

to satisfy Wainwright, then th e impact on the administration of
justice of making that interpretation retroactive can never be
~

mitigated by application of the state's contemporaneous objection
rules.

.

.

This would be contrary to the suggestion in Hankerson .

-6-

Moreover, the trial in tpis case was held three months after
Mullaney was decided and, therefore, the rule of that case was
not new or unanticipated.

Judge Merritt dissented separately,

but agreed with the reasoning of Judge Kennedy on the Wainwright
issue.
On the same day that the Isaac decision carne out, a panel of
the CA 6 (Merritt, Brown & Martin) decided the

~ell

case.

Judge

Brown wrote the opinion and specifically adopted his opinion for
the plurality in Isaac.

Judge Kerritt dissented, citing his

dissent in Isaac.
A panel of the CA 6 (Kennedy, Martin & Phillips) decide d the
Hughes case several days later.

The panel issued a brief order,

relying on Isaac.
4.

CONTENTIONS:

Petr contends that the decision of the CA

6 is in direct conflict with Hankerson,

~~a,

and with the

~Q

bane decision of the CA 4 in Co l e v. Stevenson, 620 F.2d 1055
(1980).

Petr argues that resps did not satisfy the cause

requirement of Wainwright because the result reached by the Ohio
court in Robinson was not "unanticipatable" at the time of trial,
and notes that counsel in Robin s on did make the objection that
counsel failed to make here.

Petr further argues that the

prejudice requirement of Wainwr i ght was not met here because
assigning the defendant the bur den of proof on the issue of selfdefense is not in itself uncons t itutional.

(The Ohio law prior

to its change in 1974 was not unconstitutional.)

The CA 6

avoided this problem by effectively rewriting the Ohio statute:
it held that the enactment of

§

2901.05 in 1974 created a

I

-7functional element of
defense."

t~e

crime of "absence of the affirmative

Under Ohio law, however, the existence or nonexistence

of the affirmative defense is collateral to the elements of the
crime.

See State v. Poole, 33 Ohio St.2d 18 (1973).

Thus, the

CA 6 found prejudice in the failure of the state courts to apply
a state statutory benefit and this reflects a misperception of
the role of the federal courts upon habeas review.
Resp Bell argues that the en bane decision was not as
fragmented as it seems at first.

No member of the court denied

that the state had erred in making defendants prove their
innocence by establishing that they acted in self-defense; seven
judges found that the misallocation of the burden of proof was an
error of constitutional magnitude; and six judges found that the
standard set forth in Wainwright was met.

Furthermore, Ohio law

on the issue of the burden of proof with respect to affirmative
defenses has been so confused and inconsistent that the present
case is particularly unsuited for review by this Court.

This

case is distinguishable from the CA 4 decision in Cole on two
grounds.

First, the benefit claimed in fole derived directly

from this Court's prior pronouncements on the constitutional
requirement of proving guilt beyond a reasonable doubt; it was
not tainted by any inconsistent or contradictory actions by the
state legislature and courts.

Second, to the extent that there

was confusion on the meaning of the federal constitutional
standard, the state here, unlike ih Cole, was itself the cause of
that confusion.

Finally, the decision below is of limited

-·8-

precedential value because it relies heavily upon the unique
circumstances of Ohio law, and applies to only a narrow category
of cases tried between 1974 and 1978.
Resp Hughes has filed a separate response, which adopts the
substantive reasoning presented in that of Bell.

Hughes points

out that both he and Isaac have received a final release
{termination) of their parole from the State of Ohio.

This

means, that as far as the State of Ohio is concerned, both have
fully served their entire sentences.

The petr here is the

superintendent of the correctional facility where Isaac and
Hughes had been held.

He was named as the party defendant by

virtue of the fact that he was the individual who held custody of
Hughes and Isaac when the habeas corpus petition was filed.
Since his sole interest in this proceeding stemmed from the fact
that he was the custodian and since his custodial interest has
terminated independently of these proceedings, he no longer has a
concrete interest in the cases against Isaac and Hughes.
Resp Isaac has filed a separate response, which is not very
clear.

He appears to take the approach accepted by the CA 6

panel, concentrating on the Due Process implications of limited
retroactivity.
5.

DISCUSSION:

Resp Hughes seems correct in pointing out

an initial problem as to whether or not there is still a live
controversy between petr and re s ps Hughes and Isaac.

The

petition is not altogether clear, but it does state that "Hughes

-

and Isaac were granted final

relea~es

thus have served their sentence s ."

as a matter of parole and

Although the collateral

-9-

consequences of a conviction would keep the matter alive had
resps lost below, it is not at all clear that petr,
superintendent of the correctional institute, is any longer the
proper party to represent the state's continuing interest or that
a habeas proceeding is the proper forum for this.

However,

because the petition refers to parole, it is not clear that
parole could not still be revoked.

(Although the reference to

"final releases" indica'tes that it could not.)

I

Because of this

confusion as to the status of the case with respect to Isaac and
Hughes, I recommend that if the Court grants this case it take
one of two approaches.

First, it could grant the petition

limited to the Bell case and hold the other two.
could ask for further
prior to granting.

bri~fing

Second, it

on the potential mootness point

'

I would recommend the first approach as the

~~

simplest.
Both of the issues raised by the cert petition are
important.

There is a conflict with the en bane decision of the

CA 4 on the question of whether a change in the law can satisfy

----~---------------

the "cau3.e" requirement of Wainwright.

--

The CA 4 seems to have

believed it was bound by the footnote in Hankerson:
"If change of law is cause for failing to object,
then no state proce~ural ~ar could prevent
federal habeas corpus in the context of cases
held to be retroactive,· and the Supreme Court's
reliance on procedural bar as a reason for
extending Mullanet _ietroactively would be
circumvented. Footnote 8 cl~arly implies that
the Court feeis that cn a nge of law is not cause
under Wainwright."
~
620 F.2d at 1063.
I don't read the language of the Hankerson footnote to have
definitively settled the issue.

It says only that "the states .

-10•• may be able to insulate past convictions by forcing the
normal and valid rule that failure to object to a jury
instruction is a waiver of any claim."

Since a conflict has

developed in the circuits over this issue, it may be appropriate
for the Court to decide the point left open in Hankerson.
The second question raised by the petition, whether there
was prejudice, also raises an

~nteresting

plurality opinion below, which is the

.....-------

question.

~ajority

I read the

QQinion in Bell,

to hold that by assuming the burden of proof beyond a reasonable
doubt

respect to the absence of self-defense, the state has

\~ith

effectively defined the absence of self-defense as as element of
crime.

At least there is no constitutional distinction between a

statute which laid out the elements of the offense to include the
absence of self-defense and a separate statute which although
speaking of self-defense as an "affirmative defense" puts the
burden on the state to prove its absence.

This combination of

the reasonable doubt standard with what appears to be an
affirmative defense puts the case somewhere between Mull a ney and
Patterson.

It may, therfore, be a good vehicle by which the

Court could clarify the tension between those two cases that has
troubled the lower courts.
My recommendation then is that the Court consider a
grant on both issues, but consi der limiting the grant to the Bell
case alone.
There are three responses.
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Question Presented
Whether in the circumstances of this case there was
"cause and prejudice" permitting federal
habeas
despite
..
.
.review
..
the defendant's failure · to obey a state contemporaneous

2.

In 1975 Isaac was convicted in Ohio state court of
one count of aggravated assault.
defense of

self-defense,

jury

the

that

and

defendant

At trial, Isaac relied on a

the trial

bore

the

judge instructed the

burden

of

proving

affirmative defense by a preponderance of the evidence.

his
This

was the standard jury charge on self-defense at that time, and

~saac

objecti~

made no

/h;!J

~~

Prior to 1974, Ohio followed the traditional common
law rule that both the burden of going forward and of proving
affirmative defenses rested on the defendant.

In that year,

however, the Ohio legislature undertook to codify the burden
of proving affirmative defenses as follows:
(A) Every person accused of an offense is presumed
innocent until proven guilty beyond a reasonable
doubt,
and
the burden of proof
is upon the
prosecution.
The burden of going forward with the
evidence of an affirmative defense is upon the
accused. § 2901.05(A).

Initially,

this codification was

any change in the law.
before he had

not thought to have worked

However, after Isaac was convicted but

taken an appeal,

the State Supreme Court held

that the codification had in fact changed the burden of proof

~

effective January 1, 1974.

s;f~(:

state's

burden

to

absence

of

affirmative

an

prove,

The court held that it was now the
beyond

a

defense,

reasonable
once

State v. Robinson, 47 Ohio St.2d 103 (1976).

doubt,

properly

ldR

the~

raised.

~

~

1--rJ S-1-i:t::£
<-~d

~

'

.
•.1'

3.

In his appeal, Isaac relied upon Robinson to attack
the

jury

trial,

instructions.
the

Citing

intermediate

conviction.

Isaac's failure

court

of

to object at

appeals

affirmed

his

The State Supreme Court dismissed his appeal in

1977 for lack of a substantial question. On the same day that
it dismissed Isaac's appeal, the state Supreme Court held that
its decision in Robinson was applicable retroactively to all
trials held after January 1, 1974, but only if the defendant
objected

to

the

instructions

at

the

time

trial.

of

Isaac then applied for federal habeas relief, arguing that the
State's

refusal

to

grant

him

the

decision violated due process.
Isaac

had

waived

his

it

defendant

at
to

rested on an
shown

permit

object

Ohio
to

Robinson

to

claim

by

failing

Rule

30

requires

Criminal

jury

the

instructions

before

the

a

jury

~

rrr

As such, the State court's rejection of his appeal~

retires.

had

trial.

of

The district court held that

constitutional

"-...r

present

benefit

independent

neither

the

court

cause
to

~~

state procedural ground,
nor

hear

actual
his

prejudice

federal

and Isaac

necessary

claim

despite

to
his

procedural default.
A panel of
and Peck).

the CA6

reversed

(Celebreeze,

As a preliminary matter, Judge Peck

Phillips

nQt~d

that the

CA did not need to decide whether the State court's decision
to apply Robinson retroactively as a matter of state law would
have
(1975)

been

required

under

Mullaney

v.

and Hankerson v. North Carolina,

Wilbur,
432

421

u.s.

U.S.

233

684

(1977).

·,

4.

Turning

the

selective

extent that

merits,

~

CA held that the cause and
-1
prejudice standard was simply irrelevant to Isaac's attack on
the

to

the

retroactive

application

Isaac challenged

the

of

Robinson.

To

the

jury instructions at trial

the cause and prejudice standard might block his claim.
Isaac's major
..__ claim was not
.-- that the

But

jury instructions were

unconstitutional but that a selective retroactive application
I

'-\

of Robinson itself violated due process.

The purposes of the

contemporaneous objection rule were not served in this case-Isaac had no reason to suspect that the instructions were not
valid.
that

To

he

bar

failed

Isaac
to

from ·' benefit of Robinson on the basis

lodge

an

objection was

capricious exercise of state procedural law.
filed

a

concurring

opinion

in which

he

an

arbitrary and

Judge Celebrezze

argued

that

it was

irrelevant whether Isaac should have objected or not:

Having

agreed to assume the burden of proof after January 1, 197 4,
and considering the fundamental nature of the burden of proof
to the truth finding process, the State must adhere to its own
procedures.
The CA en bane affirmed but on a different ground.
The

CA was

no

longer

content

to

argue

that

the

selective~

application of a retroactive rule of state law was arbitrary
and capricious.
a

holding

rules.

Footnote 8 in Hankerson, casts doubt on such

and

requires

Rather,

"the

more
more

deference to state procedural
.
appropriate focus
is on the
J

underlying claim, in this case the constitutional validity of

·•

..

•'·

··'

5.

the

jury

at

context,~~
state's

threshold

limiting

of

Isaac's

question,
the

then,

retroactive

In

trial
is

not

this

whether

benefits

of

the

a

new

statutory interpretation through the use of a procedural rule
is

constitutional

but

~eludes

effectively

-

whether
federal

that

state

habeas

procedural

corpus

review

rule

of

the

underlying constitutional claim."
(?~ ~

To measure the effect of the procedural rule, the CA

~

applied the "cause and prejudice" rule stated in wainwright v.
Sykes, 433 U.S.

72

(1977) •

Because there was no indication ~
d

at the time of Isaac's trial that the jury instruction
by the trial court was contrary to state law,
been futile

for

Isaac to object.

given-~

ha~

it would

A defendant should not be J J~

•

./J

~------~~--~----~----------

~

Moreover, the prejudice

to Isaac was clear since he was forced to bear the burden of ~

~~

proving self defense.

k~~

~~

the~

Confident that it could reach Isaac's attack on

jury instructions, the CA then considered whether that attack
raised a question of federal law.

In In re Winship, 397

(1970), and Mullaney' v. Wilbur, 421

Court

.a.

The prejudice in such a case might be~

presumed.

358

·

~
'

required to anticipate changes in the law, and Isaac's failure
to object was supported by "cause."

""

held

that

the

state

could

not

u.s.
place

684

(1975), the

the

proving an element of the crime on the defendant.

-

the Court had limited Mullaney somewhat

u.s.

burden

of

Although

in Patterson v.

New

York, 432 U.S. 197 (1977) , "due process requires that a state

6.

prove all elements of the crime as the state has defined the
crime."
Isaac

was

convicted

of

aggravated
~t

affirmative defense of self-defense did
crim~.

of__ this
and

Even so,

Patterson:

burden

of

"Can

proof

The

negate an element

the question arises under Mullaney

Ohio,

with

assault.

having

respect

to

by

statute

absence

of

assumed

the

self-defense,

consistently with due process convict a defendant by applying
a different and lesser standard of proof"?
the question in the negative:

The CA answered

Once the State chose to assume

the burden of proof, fundamental fairness required that it be
bound by that decision.

"From the point of view of fairness

and

is

due

process,

requiring a

there

state

to prove

no

practical

difference

between

the elements of crimes beyond a

reasonable doubt and requiring it to meet its assumed burden
of proving absence of affirmatite defenses beyond a reasonable
doubt."

The habeas petition was granted.
There

opinions.

were

several

concurring

and

dissenting

Chief Judge Edwards argued that under Mullaney and

Hankerson the burden of proving self defense could not rest on
the

defendant,

regardless

of

state

law.

He

joined

the

majority's treatment of the cause and prejudice question.
Judge Jones concurred in the result only.
In a rather opaque dissent, Judge Lively argued that
there

was

no

federal

constitutional

violation

in

Isaac's

conviction. All that the State had done in the new statute as

7.

interpreted by the State court was to reduce the quantum of
proof needed

to permit an acquittal on the ground of self-

Quite

defense.

self-defense
simply

put

simply,

by
in

a

the

defendant

preponderance

enough

statute said no more

evidence

of
to

than that.

no

the

longer

need

evidence,

raise

the

prove

but

must

defense~

the

The State had not made "a

determination that absence of the facts necessary to sustain a
plea of

self-defense

1

must

be

either

proved

or

presumed.

There had been no change in the elements of the offense.

1

"

Nor

was there any constitutional requirement that the State make
its rule retroactive in all instances. Judge Engel joined in
this dissent.
Judge Kennedy argued that there had been no showing
~

of "cause and prejudice."
the

Court

expressly

retroactive
burden of

the

In Hankerson, 432 U.S., at 244 n.8,

noted

that

Court was not

re-trying

by

holding

subjecting

every defendant:

Mullaney

to

the States

"The States,

to
if

be
the

they

wish, may be able to insulate past convictions by enforcing
the

normal and

instruction

is

valid
a

rule that failure

waiver

of

any

to object to a

claim of

error."

The

jury
clear

implication of this statement is that a mere change in law is
not

"cause."

have

anticipated

three months
prior.

Moreover,
the

it was not

change

before his

in

impossible

law:

trial and

In

Mullaney

for
was

Isaac

to

decided

re Winship five years

He might well have objected to the instructions on the

basis of these cases.

8.
J

After

noting

his

belief

that due

process requires

the State to bear the burden of negating self defense as an
element

of

the

offense,

Judge

Merritt

dissented

for

the

reasons given by Judge Kennedy.
Hughes

and

Bell were

decided

on

the

authority of

Isaac.
Note that Hughes and Isaac have been granted final
releases as a matter of parole.

Bell is still in prison.

The

parties do not address the question of mootness in the case of
Hughes and Isaac.

T~ 4)5 ·.

Discussion
~f-'( ~
~~~-~ ~~

II.

There

are

~~~~
~~~h...M...~

two questions

in

this

Th ~

case.

a~~~king

question is wheth.er these defendants

~

a
~~~~
collateral attack on the jury instructions by their failure to
2
~-~... ~,
comply with Ohio's contemporaneous o~jection rule. These cases
provide the Court with an opportunity to explain the meaning
of the "cause and prejudice"
Wainwright v.

Sykes.

test stated but not defined in

In particular,

these cases permit the

Court to decide whether the assumed futility of an objection-or the fact that a legal basis for an objection does not yet
exist--is

"cause"

considerable

for

failing

uncertainty

in

to object.

these

cases

~'
as

to

federal constitutional violation ever existed.

there

whether

is
any

It is unclear

that the change in state law and the State's decision to limit

a.cyues

that

requirement
Although

the
as

the

CA6

stated

Sykes

has

virtually

by the Court

Court

did

not

destroyed

the

"cause"

i n Wainwright v.
attempt

to

give

Sykes.
precise

definition to the terms "cause an d prejudiced," it made clear
that the "deliberate bypass" or "knowing waiver" tests stated
in

Fay

v.

Noia

no

longer

governed.

If

a

belief

that

an

objection will be futile or if failure to anticipate a change
in the law are sufficient t o s h ow cause, then there is little
difference between "cause" an d "d el1berate
·
bypass."
Our

system

guarantees

all

d e f en d ants

counsel. But it does not guarantee all ~aFanA~-•-

competent

After

noting

his

belief

that due process requires

the State to bear the burden of negating self defense as an
element

of

the

offense,

Judge

Merritt

dissented

for

the

reasons given by Judge Kennedy.
Hughes

and

Bell were

decided on

the

authority of

Isaac.
Note that Hughes and Isaac have been granted final
releases as a matter of parole.

Bell is still in prison.

The

parties do not address the question of mootness in the case of
Hughes and Isaac.
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II.

There

are

two questions

~~~L--?
~~~~~

in

this

Th~

case.

a~~~king

question is whether these defendants

~

a
~~~~
collateral attack on the jury instructions by their failure to
7
~-~--~,
comply with Ohio's contemporaneous o~jection rule. These cases
provide the Court with an opportunity to explain the meaning
of the "cause and prejudice"
Wainwright v.

Sykes.

test stated but not defined in

In particular,

these cases permit the

Court to decide whether the assumed futility of an objection-or the fact that a legal basis for an objection does not yet
exist--is

"cause"

considerable

for

failing

uncertainty

in

to object.

these

cases

~,
as

federal constitutional violation ever existed.

to

there

whether

is
any

It is unclear

that the change in state law and the State's decision to limit

..

,.·

the

retroactive effect of

constitutional

rights.

the change implicated any federal

Thus,
.__

even

if

cause

and

prejudice

could be shown, it is unclear that any basis for habeas relief
---~

exists.

To make matters more confusing, the State has framed

'--

this substantive constitutional question--going to the merits
of

the

habeas

petition--as

if

it were

"cause and prejudice" analysis:
shown,

when

the

habeas

part of

the

initial

Whether "prejudice" has been

petitioner

has

failed

to

allege

a

violation of his federal constitutional rights.

A.

Cause

Both the State and the SG argue with some force that
the CA has misconstrued
argues

that

the

requirement
Although

as

the

CA6

stated

Sykes

the

has

"cause" requirement.
virtually

by the Court

Court

did

not

destroyed

The State
the

"cause"

in Wainwright v.
attempt

to

give

Sykes.
precise

definition to the terms "cause and prejudiced," it made clear
that the "deliberate bypass" or "knowing waiver" tests stated
in

Fay

v.

Noia

no

longer

governed.

If

a

belief

that

an

objection will be futile or if failure to anticipate a change
in the law are sufficient to show cause, then there is little
difference between "cause" and "deliberate bypass."
Our

system

guarantees

all

defendants

competent

counsel. But it does not guarantee all defendants counsel of
equal

competence.

Some

lawyers will have greater

foresight

and

will

anticipate

objections

changes

in

the

Indeed,

law.

they will often cause changes

made, to the benefit of the system.

in

the

by
law

their
to

Attorneys should have an

incentive to change the law and anticipate developments.
the circumstances of this case,
the

fact

that

counsel

Mullaney

realized

In

and particularly in view of

was

decided

before

the

Ohio

criminal

that

be

trial while
law

had

all
been

recodified,

there was no reason why Isaac's attorney should

not

objected

have

circumstances
(1966) ,

in

objection

to

distinguish
which

rule

the

could

jury

the

O'Connor

Court
not

v.

held

bar

instructions.

that

relief

violation of Griffin v. California, 380
Moreover,

Ohio,
a

385

u.s.

92

contemporaneous

for

u.s.

These

an

antecedent

609 (1965).

if the notion of finality is to have any

place in the criminal system, the states must be permitted to
insist

upon

Hankerson

their

Court

o6~~ction

contemporaneous

recognized

this

in

footnote

rules.
8

in which

The
it

noted that although Mullaney would be applied retroactively,
failure to object at trial would bar retrial if the state had
a contemporaneous objection rule.

-

The SG,
CA6

has

left

little

emphasizes

the

objection

rules:

avoidance

of

defense

as amicus,
to

important

error

attorneys.

the

cause

policies

such

rules

while
Only

agrees with the State that the

they

for

requirement.
served

promote

re-

by contemporaneous
finality

discourage

"cause"

The SG

ought

and

sandbagging
these

the
by

important

>,

,.'

.i..i.o

policies be overborne.

Yet the CA did not explain why the

apparent futility of an objection ought to amount to cause.
If "cause" exists when an attorney simply inadvertently fails
to make an objection, then "cause" and "deliberate bypass" are
identical.

Nor

should

"cause"

exist

when

an

attorney

deliberately decides not to object because the objection will
probably be futile.
to make

some

Such a decision is a tactical decision--

claims,

but not others--no different

other tactical decision.

If the tactic does not pay off, that

is the price of an adversary system.
have it both ways.

than any

But the defendant cannot

He cannot withhold his objection because

he believes that to be the more effective way to present his
case, and then complain when he loses.
"has

been denied

a

fair

opportunity

Only when a defendant
to

raise

his

claim

in

accordance with the governing procedural rules" should there
be

a

finding

of

"cause"

sufficient

to excuse

a

procedural

default.
The

SG

emphasizes

that

his

requirement is in no sense unfair.

view

of

the

caus~

A defendant has no right

to have his claims at trial considered in light of subsequent

--

legal

perfection.
change

)

developments.

in

The

the

system

law would

under the old law.
there

would

be

The

Were

little

system

simply
require

aims

could

fa1rness

operate

retrial of

"f~tility"

incentive

not

at

if

not
every

those convicted

sufficient to show cause,

for

lawyers

to

anticipate

changes

or

make

new

claims,

and

sandbagging

would

be

encouraged.
Finally, the SG agrees with the State that even if
futility is sufficient "cause," there was no such futility in
the circumstances of
fully
Indeed,

to

be

this case.

anticipated

given

The result
the

in Robinson was

amendment

to

Ohio

law.

the result in Robinson suggests that objection would

not have been futile.
The

SG

notes

in

a

footnote

that

he

is

unsure

whether the "prejudice" component of the "cause and prejudice"
test is before the Court given the manner in which the State
framed

If the proper definition of

the prejudice question.

the "prejudice" prong is before the Court, then the SG wishes
it

to

cases.

be

known

that

it

was

not

properly applied

The CA presumed prejudice.

in

these

But the test of prejudice

is actual prejudice, and having found cause the CA should have
remanded to the trial court to assess whether a different jury
instruction

would

have

any

made

difference

in

the

circumstances of these cases.
Although
persuasive,

I

I

find

these

arguments

. s unconv1nce
. d
rema1n

that

a

to

be

demanding

somewhat
"cause"

requirement would promote the purposes of the contemporaneous
objection rule.
secondary
Brennan's

This is a point which is often made in the

literature.
argument

contemporaneous

One
that

objection

frequently
most

rules

encounters

violations

will

occur

due

of
to

Justice
states'
attorney

.... '

'

.,,

.
)r.,.'

'

inadvertence not to "sandbagging."

13.

See 91 Harv. L. Rev. 70,

217-218:

"There is good reason to believe that sandbagging
is not often a useful tactic, and that in any event
federal courts are sufficiently able to deter it.
The most likely explanation for procedural defaults,
then, is attorney error.
If a lawyer's default
results from inadvertence, the Sykes rule will not
increase the chance that the objection will be
raised in the state trial. Thus, the choice between
~and Sykes is neutral with respect to the goals
~ promoting
determinations
based
on
'fresh
evidence' and deciding all issues in one proceeding.
Finally, it seems unwarranted to presume that state
judges
will
ignore
their
own
contemporaneous
objection rules."

The

Harvard

article

standard be adopted:

suggests

that

a

"reasonable

attorney"

"the court can examine the trial

recor~

to see whether there was in fact a deliberate bypass and,
not,

whether

defense

it

attorney

~~~

is more likely than not that a reasonable~
would

have

considered

objection and decided not to raise it."
See

W d.--t

also,

Tague,

the

/

constitutional~~

~5

c.: .o : . : .r . _p~u. ; s_ ___;;ca;.:.;n;_;.;_~

.::.F. .;;e.. ;;d;_:e.. ;;r;_;a;:.:l=----=H.=.:a;:.:b=-e=-a=s__

Ineffective Assistance of Counsel, 31 Stan.L.Rev. 1 (1978):
"If
Estelle
and
Sykes
illustrate
the
defendant's burden, few defendants will be able to
establish
cause.
If
the
attorney
exercises
professional
judgment,
perhaps
simply
if
the
attorney consciously decides not t9 object, the
defendant will be·barred from habeas relief. It is
not enough for the defendant to show that counsel
failed to research or to understand the law, or
objected o-n the wrong ground, or failed to get a
ruling on the objection from the trial court, or
failed to · discover the information upon which the
objection was based in time to comply with the
procedural rule. It is not enough for the defendant
to show that counsel wrongly decided that the motion

14.

would be denied, or that counsel was not motivated
by either
the
hope of gaining
some
tactical
advantage or of avoiding some possible harm, or that
the defendant disagreed with counsel's decision. And
there is no suggestion
that the habeas court
must review the reasonableness of the attorney's
decision.
Finally, it is not enough to show that
counsel did not know of the information that would
have supported an objection, at least if this
infomration was reasonably discoverable.
There
are,
however,
several
ways
the
defendant might establish cause. First, if counsel
did object, albeit out-of-time, the defendant could
show that counsel's failure to strictly comply with
the
procedural
rule
was
inadvertentand
not
deliberate.
Second, the defendant could show that
the attorney did not actually decide to refrain from
objecting: Counsel might have lacked the competence
to recognize the issue~
the practice challenged on
post-conviction appeal may have been so customary in
the jurisdiction that a reasonable trial attorney
might not have objected~
the government may have
failed to reveal information that would have alerted
counsel to the issue~
or the legal basis for the
objection may have been discovered or even created
only after the time for objection had passed but
before the conviction became final.
Third, the
defendant might show cause if the attorney decided
not to object because objecting might have had
'grisly' results
for
the
defendant,
or
because
counsel reasonably feared that the trial court or
jury might retaliate against the defendant in
response to the objection.
Finally, the defendant
might also show that no attorney would ever have
made a tactical decision to refrain from objecting-that any attorney who had recognized the possiblity
of an objection would have made one." (emphasis
added}

I
exacting

think

cause

the argument

standard

contemporaneous objection

--

does

that any of the defendants

rules.

is fairly convincing that an

LJ

not

~

It

serve
is

the

purposes

scarcely

in these cases were

of

5

believable~
~

sandbagging~~

The jury instructions were standard and the State court had 5" h£._

~

.. :'•

·,

15.

not yet altered its position.
the

cause

requirement

characterize a

in

However else one would apply

another

decision not

case,

to object

it
in

is di ff icul t
these cases

to

as

a

tactical decision.
I
limiting

think

the

you

burden

have
of

two more sensible ways of ~

found

federal

habeas.

In

your '!i"ankerson

.

~
~

concurrence you argue
should

not

be

that new federal constitutional _1;ules

applied

retroactively

in

habeas

proceedings.

Presumably that would knock out quite a few habeas cases.
in

~ne

v.

Powell,

you succeeded

in ending

([)

And

the collateral

V

review of search and seizure decisions where there had been a
full and fair consideration of the question in state court.
Unfortunately, you were less successful in Rose v. Mitchell. ~
I think that these approaches are more analytically satisfying
than an artificially high "cause" standard.
you,

and

I

think

along with a

it is difficult,

higher ' bause ~ standard

The question for

is whether you should go
in light of the Court's

apparent unwillingness to place further substantive limits on
the availability of habeas or to place a flat limit on the
retroactive

application

of

new

~

constitutional

rules

in

?
5

collateral proceedings. The difficulty with an "insurmountable
cause" approach is illustrated in these cases.

If there has

been a violation of constitutional rights in this case, it is
the

right

proof.
'--

to be

tried under

the state prescribed burden

Such a right appears to go to the basic

~ the trial and to guilt or innocence.

A high

'

'

16.

will keep these defendants from habeas relief,

but

constitutional

whether

claims

are

valid,

I

question

if their/
they ~

should not be able to present their claims upon habeas.
This is not to say that procedural defaults will be
forgiven

in

any

"reasonable

instance.

attorney"

Perhaps

approach--would

one
a

might

adopt

reasonable

the

attorney

have been aware of the objection and decided not to make it
for tactical reasons?

There may be cases in which the failure

to object is inexcusable and where the objection deals with a
"trial

v

type"

questions

right

the

rather

than

a

basic

fairness

of

Estelle v. Williams,

425 U.S.

501

right

the

whose

infringement
Thus,

proceedings.

(1976) ,

in

the defendant was

tried for assault with intent to commit murder in Texas state
court.

He was

object.

tried

However,

in prison garb;

~exas

his attorney did not

has no contemporaneous objection rule.

The USDC rejected Williams' §2254 petition;

the CA reversed.

Although there was no violation of a contemporaneous objection
rule, the Chi"ef reasoned that only if Williams was compelled
to

wear

prison

garb

was

there

a

constitutional

violation.

Having framed the issue in this way, the Chief's analysis of
c.J2S
the indicia of compulsion _.XS strikingly similar to a "cause
and

prejudice"

sort of

analysis.

Because Williams

had

not

objected, because the record indicated that such an objection
would

not

have

been futile,

and

because

the

record did not

indicate that Willaims' counsel had anything to fear from any
objection,

it

could

not

be

said

that

Willaims

had

been

'Jt.o

17.

"compelled"
sufficient

to stand
reason

trial

to

excuse

before trial."
In

in

jail garb or

the

failure

~

concurring

despite

in

an

to raise

~ £,__ k.UJ_ v LU~

-

noted

that

.1\

situations

"that there was

which

a , conviction

infringement

knowing waiver of

the

of

a

right and

should

there

be

a

or

(1}

"inexcusable procedural

view

choice

two

standing

right:

This was a case of inexcusable default:
tactical

were

left

default."
that

issue

j

constitutional
(2}

the

procedural

"It is my

default

of

the

nature of that involved here ordinarily should operate, as a
matter of federal

law,

substantive right."

to preclude the later raising of the

You emphasized that this was "a curable

trial defect" and that the right at stake was "a trial-type
right" such that the attorney's error ought to bind the client
(citing Henry v. Mississippi,
There

was

evidence

deliberately decided

in

the

not

379

u.s.

record

to object

443,

that

451-452

the

because of

(1965}}.

defendant

had

an erroneous

belief that the objection would be futile.
I may be giving the lawyers in this case too much of
the benefit of the doubt.
Mullaney and

Certainly, given the decision in

the amendment to Ohio law, a good lawyer might

have thought to make an objection in these cases.

And habeas

ought not to be the corrective for the inherent problems of an
adversary system. But, on the whole, I would not support the
rigid cause standard urged by the government.

M .......

18.

I will consider the constitutional question in the
next section, but I am afraid you will have to wait until the
morning to read it.

I do apologize.

,

'

,,
'•

...

18.

dfl 12/08/81

Engle v. Isaac--No. 80-1430 (continued)

B.

The

Prejudice

State

argues

that

no prejudice was

shown

these cases because there was no constitutional violation.

in
By

framing the argument in this way, the State has collapsed the
prejudice

inquiry

with

the

merits

of

the

habeas

petition.

~~--~==~----------~~--~-------------

This is

6aly~

The showing of prejudice required

to overcome a procedural default need not be the same as the
prejudice required to show a constitutional violation.
The CA6 found a federal constitutional violation in
these cases upon an analogy to Mullaney and Patterson:
As we read Mullaney and Patterson, while the
st tes are largely free to define crimes as they
choose,
fundamental fairness and therefore due
process re uire that they prove the elements of the
crimes, as t e sta t:es
ave c osen to de£ 1ne - them,
beyond a ~ reasonable~. -we further conclude
that, once a state assumed the burden of proving the
absence
of
an
affirmative
defense
beyond
a
reasonable doubt, fundamental fairness and therefore
due process require it to meet the burden that it
chose to assume. From the point of view of fairness
and due process, there is no practical difference
between requiring a state to prove the elem~nts of
cr1mes beyond a reasonabre doubt and requ1ring-lt to
meet its assumed bur en of proving absence - of

19.

affirmative defenses beyond a reasonable doubt.
Thus we conclude that, in Isaac's trial, placing the
burden
on
him
to
prove
self-defense
by
a
preponderance of the evidence constituted a denial
of federal due process."

It
holding.

is

important

to note

just what

the CA6

is not

First, it is not holding that the State must assume

the burden of defeating affirmative offenses.

Such a holding

would not be justified in light of Patterson, although two of
the concurring judges apparently felt that the change in Ohio
law was required by Mullaney and Patterson.

8.~Y t!!!,.t @

~

and as a matter of state law, Ohio chooses to

-

assume

that burden,
...............................

federal due process.
Mullaney:

c~~:.

Rather, it

Due

then

it

must

bear

it

as

a

matter

of

One can draw a rather strong analogy to

process

did

not

require Maine

to

include an

absence of provocation and passion in its definition of the
crime of murder:
requires

the

once the State did so, however, due process

state

to

bear

the

burden

of

disproving

provocation and passion.
Second, the CA did not hold that the State court's
decision in Robinson had

to be applied retroactively in all

cases as a matter of federal constitutional law.
approach taken by the panel in the first decision.

That was the
Judge Peck

argued that it was arbitrary and capricious to insist upon the
contemporaneous objection rule and that Robinson must apply to
all tried after January 1, 1974.

But the CA en bane opinion

·,(

,.

..,

...

20.

relied solely on the fact that the statute changed the law as
of January 1, 1974.
it

interpreted

Robinson was of value to the CA because

the

statute.

But

the
$

constitutional violation was not

the

source
of
the
t,.~
decision to apply

t4.(t. (.0CA-r

~

others~

Robinson retroactively in some cases but not
the

source

decision

of

to

the

constitutional

assume

the

burden

defenses as of January 1, 1974.

violation was
of

disproving

rather,

the

State's

affirmative

Had the CA based its finding

of a constitutional violation on the state court's decision to
apply Robinson retroactively in only some cases, then I think
we would have a problem with the CA's decision.
the State only assumed

the

defenses by its decision
could

limit

the

That is, if

burden of disproving affirmative

in Robinson,

retroactive

then surely the State

application

of

that

decision.

Your concurrence in Hankerson suggests the propriety of such
limitations.
Judge
State

did

not

Lively
assume

argues
the

in

burden

dissent
of

that

in

disproving

fact

affirmative

defenses.

The

defendant.

It did not reassign the burden to the State.

State

simply

removed

the

the

burden

from

the
This

is a clever argument, but I doubt it makes much difference.

I

would

a

think

that

Mullaney

defendant was forced
when State
defendant.

.
·,

law did

would

govern

a

case

in

which

to bear the burden of proving a defense
not

in

fact

allocate

the

burden

to

the

21.

Finally,

it

m kes

one's

head

s in

consider ~

to

precisely how your Hankerson concurrence would apply if the
Court affirms the CA6.

The Court will hold that once a State

has assumed the burden of disproving affirmative defenses, or
once Ohio has removed the burden of proof from the defendant,
it must adhere to that allocation of the burden or violate due
process.

Such a holding would be something of an

extension

of Mullaney, and I think you could take the position that the
rule should only be available to defendants on direct appeal.
Would

that

mean

instructions

other

defendants

tried

under

the old

in Ohio, after 1974, could not raise the claim

upon habeas?
that

that

That would

these cases come

themselves.

seem to

to

be a

the Court

strange result given

in a collateral posture

Now that Ohio has returned--as of 11/1/78--to its

-

old rule, and now clearly places the burden on the defendant ·
o nce again, the retroactivity question will only be important
to a band of defendants tried between 1974 and 1978.

III.

Much

to

my

Conclusion

surprise,

I

would

affirm

the

CA6.

I

think that there are more careful ways of limiting habeas than
by

insisting

impossible
Hankerson

for
and

constitutional

on

a
any

Stone

standard

of

cause

defendant

to

v.

points

Powell

violation,

I

think

that

meet.
the

that

Your

is

approach

way.
the

virtually

As
CA

to
makes

in
the
a

l.

"
·,

.'.

22.

convincing argument, on an analogy to Mullaney, that once the
State altered the burden of proof it was bound to adhere to
its own rules and not simply as a matter of state procedural
law.
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To:

Justice Powell

From:
Re:

David
Engle v. Isaac--No. 80-1430

I.

These are the relevant, underlying state law

1.

Prior to 1974, Ohio followed the traditional common

events:

------

law rule placing the burden of proof as to affirmative defenses
on the defendant.

2.

Effective January 1, 1974, Ohio passed a new

criminal code that included the following provision:
(A) Every person accused of an offense is presumed
innocent until proven guilty beyond a reasonable doubt,
and the burden of proof is upon the prosecution. The
burden of going forward with the evidence of an
affirmative defense is upon the accused.

Note that the statute says nothing as to the burden of proof.

3. In a 1975 decision, State v. Rogers, 43 Ohio St.2d
28 (1975), the Ohio S.C. stated in dictum that the defendant must
bear the burden of proving affirmative defenses under the new
statutory section.

-

sr;N

4.

But in a 1976 decision, State v. Robinson, 47 Ohio

St.2d 103 (1976), the Ohio SC changed course and held that the
affirmative
defenses, placing that burden on the prosecution. The defendant
bears only the burden of going forward.

The court held that a

jury instruction placing the burden of proof on the defendant was
prejudicial error.

5.

In State v. Humphries, 51 Ohio St.2d 95 (1977), the

Ohio S.C. made clear that its ruling in Robinson

~ctive~ to

w~

only apply

those defendants who objected at trial in accord

with Ohio's contemporaneous objection rule pertaining to jury
instructions.

(Rule 30).

At the same time, the S.C. held that a

defendant tried to a judge, could claim benefit of the Robinson
decision since there was no comparable contemporaneous objection
rule in the context of bench trials--the judge does not instruct
himself.

6.
hands.

-

foo 1:::
The Ohio legislature hiP.!" now

--

/\

beH ./:-t ake ~

matters into its

~----~A~-------

Effective January 1, 1978, defendants must again bear the

burden of proving affirmative defenses:
"The burden of going
affirmative defense,
preponderance of the
defense, is upon the

II.

forward with the evidence of an
and the burden of proof, by a
evidence, for an affirmative
accused.

The decisions below

Because Isaac did not object to the jury instruction he
was barred from all state court relief under Humphries.

The federal district court held that Isaac's failure to
object constituted a waiver of his claim upon Mullaney that the
erroneous jury instructions violated due process.

Without

reaching the validity of Isaac's constitutional theory, the court
dismissed because of Isaac's failure to show "cause and
prejudice."

A panel of the CA6 reversed.

The panel held that the

district court had properly barred Isaac from attacking the jury
instructions on the basis of cause and prejudice.

However, Isaac

also argued that Ohio's selective application of State v.
Robinson was itself a constitutional violation and as to this
allegation there was no requirement of contemporaneous
objection.:
"The major thrust of petitioner's claim was, and is,
not directed to the constit~ h ionality of the jury
instruction itself; but r ~~ er, it centers upon and
challenges the constitutionality of the Ohio Supreme
Court's selective application of its State v. Robinson
decision while petitioner's conviction was st1ll
pending on review in the state courts. Wainwright v.
Sykes, supra, is not applicable to this second prong of
appellant's petition."

Under the panel's holding, Isaac did not have a claim
because of Mullaney.
failure to object.

Any such claim had been forfeited by his
Rather he had a claim because the State's

insistence upon its contemporaneous objection rule itself
amounted to an independent constitutional violation.

By

permitting some defendants to be retried because they had lodged
an objection, while defendants such as Isaac were not permitted
retrial, was arbitrary and capricious.

The panel never

considered whether or not the jury instructions were themselves
constitutionally permissible.

The CA6 en bane drew back from the panel's attack on
the contemporaneous objection rule.

Recognizing that these rules

are entitled to some deference and that the Court indicated as
much in footnote 8 of Hankerson, the en bane court stated:

"We

are ... hesitant to hold, as did the panel opinion, that this use
of a contemporaneous objection rule to limit the retroactive
benefits of a new statutory interpretation is, ipso facto,
violative of due process."

Rather, the panel framed the issue as

follows:
"We beleive that the more appropriate focus is on the
underlying claim, in this case the constitutional
validity of the jury instructions given at Isaac's
trial as considered in light of Robinson Humphries. In
this context, the threshold question, then, is not
whether the state's limiting of the retroactive
benefits of a new statutory interpretation through the
use of a procedural rule is constitutional but whether
that state procedural rule effectively precludes
federal habeas corpus review of the underlying
constitutional claim."

The en bane court found that there was cause and
prejudice and proceeded to determine the validity of the jury

-

...
instructions.

The CA noted that absence of self-defense was not

an element of the crime of aggravated assault as defined by the
state.

Even so a Mullaney type question arose:

"Can Ohio, having by statute assumed the burden of
proof with respect to absence of self-defense,
consistently with due process convict a defendant by
applying a different and lesser standard of proof •
•••• As we read Mullaney and Patterson, while the state
are largely free to define crimes as they choose,
fundamental fairness and therefore due process require
that they prove the elements of the crimes, as the
states have chosen to define them, beyond a reasonable
doubt. we further conclude tht, once a state assumed
the burden of proving the absence of an affirmative
defense beyond a reasonable doubt, fundamental fairness
and therefore due process require it to meet the burden
that it chose to assume. From the poin to view of
fairness and due process, there is no practical
difference between requiring a state to prove the
elements of crimes beyond a reasonable doubt and
requiring it to meet its assumed burden of proving
absence of affirmative defenses beyond a reasonable
doubt."

In short, as I understand it, there are two ways of
thinking about what happened here.

The panel considered that the

Robinson decision itslef created the new right in defendants to
have the state bear the burden of disproving affirmative
defenses.

But that right was only made available,

retrospectively, to those defendants who had the good fortune to
object to the old instructions.

The panel viewed this selective,

retrospective provision of the right as arbitrary and a violation
of equal protection and due process.

The

~ bane cou ~ on the

other hand, considered that the new right was created by the

--

statute.

-------------------

The only limit on asserting the right was the state's

contemporaneous objection rule, and, if "cause and prejudice"

could be shown, the failure to object would not bar habeas
relief.

Thus, I do not think that the state's ability to make a

law only partially retrospective is at all implicated in the way
that the CA en bane approached the question.

But I may be wrong.
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SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
No. 80--1430

TED ENGLE, SUPERINTENDENT, CHILLICOTHE
CORRECTIONAL INSTITUTE, PETITIONER, v. ~'1 fiJ 11 "
LINCOLN ISAAC ~ /b_~c.::r- ~
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNIT/n STATES COURT OF ---APPEALS FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT
[February-, 1982]

JUSTICE O'CONNOR delivered the opinion of the Court.
In Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U. S. 72 (1977), we held that a
state prisoner, barred by procedural default from raising a
constitutional claim on direct appeal, could not litigate that
claim in a§ 2254 habeas corpus 1 proceeding without showing
cause for and actual prejudice from the default. Applying
the principle of Sykes to this case, we conclude that respondents, who failed to comply with an Ohio rule mandating contemporaneous objections to jury instructions, may not challenge the constitutionality of those instructions in a federal
habeas proceeding.
I
Respondents' claims rest in part on recent changes in Ohio
criminal law. For over a century, the Ohio courts required
criminal defendants to carry the burden of proving self-de' Title 28 U. S. C. § 2254(a) empowers "[t]he Supreme Court, a Justice
thereof, a circuit judge, or a district court" to "entertain an application for
a writ of habeas corpus in behalf of a person in custody pursuant to the
judgment of a State court only on the ground that he is in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States." This
statutory remedy may not be identical in all respects to the common-law
writ of habeas corpus. See Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 78 (1977).

...
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fense by a preponderance of the evidence. See State v.
Seliskar, 35 Ohio St. 2d 95, 298 N. E. 2d 582 (1973); Szalkai
v. State, 96 Ohio St. 36, 117 N. E. 12 (1917); Silvus v. State,
22 Ohio St. 90 (1871). A new criminal code, effective January 1, 1974, subjected all affirmative defenses to the following rule:
"Every person accused of an offense is presumed innocent until proven guilty beyond a reasonable doubt, and
the burden of proof is upon the prosecution. The burden of going forward with the evidence of an affirmative
defense is upon the accused." Ohio Rev. Code Ann.
§ 2901.05(A) (1975).
For more than two years after its enactment, most Ohio
courts assumed that this section worked no change in Ohio's
traditional burden-of-proof rules. 2 In 1976, however, the
Ohio Supreme Court construed the statute to place only the
burden of production, not the burden of persuasion, on the
defendant. Once the defendant produces some evidence of
self-defense, the state court ruled, the prosecutor must disprove self-defense beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. Robinson, 47 Ohio St. 2d 103, 351 N. E. 2d 88 (1976) (syllabus by
the court). 3 The present actions arose because Ohio tried
' See, e. g., State v. Rogers, 43 Ohio St. 2d 28, 30, 330 N. E. 2d 674, 676
· (1975) (noting that "self-defense is. an affirmative defense, which must be
established by a preponderance of the evidence"), cert. denied, 423 U. S.
1061 (1976). But see State v. Matthews , No. 74AP-428, p. 9 (Ct. App.
Franklin County, Ohio, Dec. 24, 1974) (§ 2901.05(A) "evinces a legislative
intent to change the burden of the defendant with respect to affirmative
defenses"); 1 0. Schroeder & L. Katz, Ohio Criminal Law and Practice
§ 2901.05, p. 14 (1974 eel.) ("The provisions of 2901.05(A) follow the modern
statutory trend in this area, requiring the accused to raise the affirmative
defense, but leaving the burden of persuasion upon the prosecution."); Student Symposium: The Proposed Ohio Criminal Code-Reform and Regression, 33 Ohio St. L. J. 351, 420 (1972) (suggesting that legislators intended
to change traditional rule).
3
In Ohio, the court's syllabus contains the controlling law. See Haas
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and convicted respondents after the effective date of
§ 2901.05(A), but before the Ohio Supreme Court's interpretation of that statute in Robinson. 4
On~er 16, 1974, an Ohio grand jury indicted respondent ughe for aggravated murder. 5 At trial the State
show
at, in the presence of seven witnesses, Hughes
shot and killed a man who was keeping company with his former girlfriend. Prosecution witnesses testified that the victim was unarmed and had just attempted to shake hands with
Hughes. Hughes, however, claimed that he acted in self-defense. His testimony suggested that he feared the victim, a
larger man, because he had touched his pocket while approaching Hughes. The trial court instructed the jury that
Hughes bore the burden of proving this defense by a preponv. State, 103 Ohio St. 1, 7-8, 132 N. E. 158, 159-160 (1921).
'Two years after Robinson, the Ohio legislature once again amended
Ohio's burden of proof law. The new§ 2901.05(A), effective November 1,
1978, provides:
"Every person accused of an offense is presumed innocent until proven
guilty beyond a reasonable doubt, and the burden of proof for all elements
of the offense is upon the prosecution. The burden of going forward with
the evidence of an affirmative defense, and the burden of pmof, by a preponderance of the evidence, for an affirmative defense, is upon the accused." Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 2901.05(A) (Supp. 1980) (emphasis
added).
This amendment has no effect on the litigation before us. Thoughout this
opinion, citations to§ 2901.05(A) refer to the statute in effect between January 1, 1974, and October 31, 1978.
; See Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 2903.01 (1975):
"(A) No person shall purposely, and with prior calculation and design,
cause the death of another.
"(B) No person shall purposely cause the death of another while committing or attempting to commit, or while fleeing immediately after committing or attempting to commit kidnapping, rape , aggravated arson or arson,
aggravated robbery or robbery, aggravated burglary or burglary, or
escape.
"(C) Whoever violates this section is guilty of aggravated murder, and
shall be punished as provided in section 2929.02 of the Revised Code."

''

'·
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derance of the evidence. Counsel for Hughes did not specifically object to this instruction. 6
On January 24, 1975, the jury convicted Hughes of voluntary manslaughter, a lesser included offense of aggravated
murder. 7 On September 24, 1975, the Summit County
Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction, and on March 19,
1976, the Supreme Court of Ohio dismissed Hughes' appeal,
finding no substantial constitutional question. 8 Neither of
these ap eals challen ed
·ury instruction on self-defense.
Ohio tne respon
t e
r aggravated mur
1
pril
1975. Evidence at t
wed that Bell was one of a group
of bartenders who had agreed to help one another if trouble
developed at any of their bars. On the evening of the murder, one of the bartenders called Bell and told him that he
feared trouble from five men who had entered his bar.
When Bell arrived at the bar, the bartender informed him
that the men had left. Bell pursued them and gunned one of
the men down in the street.
Bell defended on the ground that he had acted in self-deHughes' counsel did register a general objection "to the entire Charge
in its entirety" because "[w]e are operating now under a new code in which
many things are uncertain." App. 48. Counsel's subsequent remarks,
however, demonstrated that his objection concerned only the proposed definitions of "Aggravated Murder, Murder and Voluntary Manslaughter."
.. App. 48, 50.
.
.
. . 'Voluntary manslaughter.is "kriowi~gly caus[ing] the death of another"
while under "extreme emotional stress brought on by serious provocation
reasonably sufficient to incite [the Defendant] into using deadly force."
Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 2903.03 (A) (1975).
Hughes was sentenced to 6-25 years in prison. The State's petition for
certiorari indicated that Hughes has been "granted final releas[e] as a matter of parole." Pet. for Cert. 6. This release does not moot the controversy between Hughes and the State. See Humphrey v. Cady, 405 U. S.
504, 506-507 n. 2 (1972); Carafas v. LaVallee, 391 U. S. 234, 237-240
(1968).
~ see State v. Hughes , C. A. No. 7717 (Ct. App. Summit County, Ohio,
Sept. 24, 1975); State v. Hughes, No. 75-1026 (Ohio, March 19, 1976).
6

1
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fense. He testified that as he approached two of the men,
the bartender shouted: "He's got a gun" or "Watch out, he's
got a gun." At this warning, Bell started shooting. As in
Hughes' case, the trial court instructed the jury that Bell had
the burden of proving self-defense by a preponderance of the
evidence. Bell did not object to this instruction and the jury
convicted him of murder, a lesser included offense of the
charged crime. 9
Bell appealed to the Cuyahoga County Court of Appeals,
but failed to challenge the instruction assigning him the burden of proving self-defense. The Court of Appeals affirmed
Bell's conviction on April 8, 1976. 10 Bell appealed further to
the Ohio Supreme Court, again neglecting to challenge the
self-defense instruction. That court overruled his motion for
leave to appeal on September 17, 1976, 11 two months after it
construed § 2901.05(A) to place the burden of proving absence of self-defense on the prosecution. See State v. Robinson, supra.
Responde t Isa c as tried in September 1975 for felonious assault. 12 T
State showed that Isaac had severely
beaten his former wife's boyfriend. Isaac claimed that the
boyfriend punched him first and that he acted solely in selfdefense. Without objection from Isaac, the court instructed
• Ohio defines murder as "purposely caus[ing] the death of another."
. Ohio Rev . .Code .Ann~ . § 2903 ..02(A).(1975).· · Bell received ·a sel\tence of 15
y·e ars to life imprisonment.
·
· ..
·
10
State v. Bell , No. 34727 (Ct. App. Cuyahoga County, Ohio, April 8,
1976).

"State v. Bell, No. 76-573 (Ohio, Sept. 17, 1976).
"See Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 2903.11 (1975):
"(A) No person shall knowingly:
"(1) Cause serious physical harm to another;
"(2) Cause or attempt to cause physical harm to another by means of a
deadly weapon or dangerous ordnance as defined in section 2923.11 of the
Revised Code.
"(B) Whoever violates this section is guilty of felonious assault, a felony
of the second degree."

.. .

··,;·

. . ···. ··
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the jury that Isaac carried the burden of proving this defense
by a preponderance of the evidence. The jury acquitted
Isaac of felonious assault, but convicted him of the lesser included offense of a gravated assault. 13
en months fte Isaac's trial, the Ohio Supreme Court decided State v. R.Q~, supra. In his appeal to the
Plckaway County Court of Appeals, 14 Isaac relied upon Robinson to challenge the burden of proof instructions given at
his trial. The court rejected this challenge because Isaac {
had failed to object to the jury instructions during trial, as
required by Ohio Rule Crim. Proc. 30. 15 This default waived
13
Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 2903.12 (1975) describes aggravated assault:
"(A) No person, while under extreme emotional stress brought on by serious provocation reasonably sufficient to incite him into using deadly force
shall knowingly:
"(1) Cause serious physical harm to another;
"(2) Cause or attempt to cause physical harm to another by means of a
deadly weapon or dangerous ordnance as defined in section 2923.11 of the
Revised Code.
"(B) Whoever violates this section is guilty of aggravated assault, a felony of the fourth degree."
The judge sentenced Isaac to a term of six months to five years imprisonment. According to the State's petition for certiorari, Isaac has been released from jail. This controversy is not moot, however. Seen. 7, supra.
14
State v. Isaac, No. 346 (Ct. App. Pickaway County, Ohio, Feb. 11,

1977).

...

...

. -:·

At t~· time . HughE,!S apd BelL were tried,· this rule stated in relevant
part:
"No party may assign as error any portion of the charge or omission
therefrom unless he objects thereto before the jury retires to consider its
verdict, stating specifically the matter to which he objects and the grounds
of his objection. Opportunity shall be given to make the objection out of
the hearing of the jury."
Shortly before Isaac's trial, Ohio amended the language of the rule in minor
respects:
"A party may not assign as error the giving or the failure to give any
instructions unless he objects thereto before the jury retires to consider its
verdict, stating specifically the matter to which he objects and the grounds
16
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Isaac's claim. State v. Glaros, 170 Ohio St. 471, 166 N. E.
2d 379 (1960); State v. Slone, 45 Ohio App. 2d 24, 340 N. E.
2d 413 (1975).
The Supreme Court of Ohio dismissed Isaac's appeal for
lack of a substantial constitutional question. 16 On the same
day, that court decided State v. Humphries, 51 Ohio St. 2d
95, 364 N. E. 2d 1354 (1977), and State v. Williams, 51 Ohio
St. 2d 112, 364 N. E. 2d 1364 (1977), vacated in part andremanded, 438 U. S. 911 (1978). In Humphries the court
ruled that every criminal trial held on or after January 1,
1974, "is required to be conducted in accordance with the provisions of [Ohio Rev. Code Ann. §2901.05]." !d., at 95, 364
N. E. 2d, at 1355 (syllabus by the court). The court, however, refused to extend this ruling to a defendant who failed
to comply with Ohio Rule Crim. Proc. 30. !d., at 102-103,
364 N. E. 2d, at 1359. In Williams, the court declined to
consider a constitutional challenge to Ohio's traditional selfdefense instruction, again because the defendant had not
properly objected to the instruction at trial.
AJ!_three re.sp.onden~ unsuccessfully sought writs of habeas corpus from federal district courts. Hughes' petition
alleged that the State had violated the Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendments by failing to prove guilt "as to each and every
essential element of the offense charged" and by failing to "so
instruct" the jury. The District Judge rejected this claim,
find4lg .. that Ohio law ·does not .cQnsider absence of self-de- ...
fense an element of aggravated murder or voluntary manslaughter.
Although the self-defense instructions at
Hughes' trial might have violated § 2901.05(A), they did not
violate the federal Constitution. Alternatively, the District
of his objection. Opportunity shall be given to make the objection out of
the hearing of the jury."
Both versions of the Ohio rule closely parallel Rule 30 of the Federal Rules
of Criminal Procedure.
•• State v. Isaac, No. 77-412 (Ohio, July 20, 1977).

..
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Judge held that Hughes had waived his constitutional claim
by failing to comply with Ohio's contemporaneous objection
rule. Since Hughes offered no explanation for his failure to
object, and showed no actual prejudice, Wainwright v.
Sykes, 433 U. S. 72 (1977), barred him from asserting the
claim. Hughes v. Engle, Civ. Action No. C77-156A (N. D.
Ohio, June 26, 1979).
Bell's petition for habeas relief similarly alleged that the
trial judge had violated due process by instructing "the jury
that the accused must prove an affirmative defense by a preponderance of the evidence." The District Court acknowledged that Bell had never raised this claim in the state
courts. Observing, however, that the State addressed Bell's
argument on the merits, the District Court ruled that Bell's
default was not a "deliberate bypass." See Fay v. Noia, 372
U. S. 391 (1963). Although the court cited our opinion in
Wainwright v. Sykes, supra, it did not inquire whether Bell
had shown cause for or prejudice from his procedural waiver.
The court then ruled that Ohio could constitutionally burden
Bell with proving self-defense since it had not defined absence of self-defense as an element of murder. Bell v.
Perini, No. C 78-343 (N.D. Ohio, Dec. 26, 1978).
Bell moved for reconsideration, urging that § 2901.05(A)
had in fact defined absence of self-defense as an element of
murder. The District Court rejected this argument and
.. . :... ...then . declared that the:'~r.eal.issue" was whether·Bell·was en~.
. . titled. t~ retroa~tlve application of State v. Robi~son, suprd.
Bell failed on this claim as well since Ohio's decision to limit
retroactive application of Robinson "substantially further[ed]
the State's legitimate interest in the finality of its decisions."
App. to Pet. for Cert. A59. Indeed, the District Court
noted that this Court had sanctioned just this sort of limit on
retroactivity. See Hankerson v. North Carolina, 432 U. S.
233, 244 n. 8 (1977). Bell v. Perini, No. C 78-343 (N.D.
Ohio, Jan. 23, 1979).

..
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~aac's habeas petition was more complex than those sub-

mitted by Hughes and Bell. He urged that the Ohio Supreme Court had "failed to give relief [to him], despite its
own pronouncement" that State v. Robinson would apply retroactively. In addition, he declared broadly that the Ohio
court's ruling was "contrary to the Supreme Court of the
United States in regard to proving self-defense." The District Court determined that Isaac had waived any constitutional claims by failing to present them to the Ohio trial
court. Since he further failed to show either cause for or actual prejudice from the waiver, see Wainwright v. Sykes,
supra, he could not present his claim in a federal habeas proceeding. Isaac v. Engle, Civ. Action No. C-2-7~278 (S.D.
Ohio, June 26, 1978).
The Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reversed all
three District Court orders. In Isaac v. Engle, 646 F. 2d
1129 (CA6 1980), a majority of the en bane court ruled that
Wainwright v. Sykes did not preclude consideration of Isaac's
constitutional claims. At the time of Isaac's trial, the court
noted, Ohio had consistently required defendants to prove af- ·
firmative defenses by a preponderance of the evidence. The
futility of objecting to this established practice supplied adequate cause for Isaac's waiver. Prejudice, the second prerequisite for excusing a procedural default, was "clear" since
the burden of proof is a critical element of factfinding, and
;'· ·: · ·...., . ·. · .:· .:··-·since·Isaac had ni.ade a substantial issue of self.:.defense. · !d.;
at 1134.
A majority of the court also believed that the instructions
given at Isaac's trial violated due process. Four judges
thought that § 2901.05(A) defined the absence of self-defense
as an element of felonious and aggravated assault. While
the State did not have to define its crimes in this manner,
"due process require[d] it to meet the burden that it chose to
assume." 646 F. 2d, at 1135. A fifth judge believed that,
even absent§ 2901.05(A), the Due Process Clause would com-

C. /l- k
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pel the prosecution to prove absence of self-defense because
that defense negates criminal intent, an essential element of
aggravated and felonious assault. A sixth judge agreed that
Ohio had violated Isaac's due process rights, but would have
concentrated on the State's arbitrary refusal to extend the
retroactive benefits of State v. Robinson, supra, to Isaac. 17
Relying on the en bane decision in Isaac, two Sixth Circuit
panels ordered the District Court to release Bell and Hughes
unless the State chose to retry them within a reasonable
time. Bell v. Perini, 635 F. 2d 575 (CA6 1980); 18 Hughes v.
Engle, judgment order reported at 642 F. 2d 451 (CA6 1980).
We granted certiorari to review all three Sixth Circuit opinions. 451 U. S. 906 (1981).
II
A state prisoner is entitled to relief under 28 U. S. C.
§ 2254 only if he is held "in custody in violation of the Constitutiol1'or laws or treaties of the United States." Insofar
•
1
"'
-as respondents s1m
ly challenge the / correctness
of the
selfdefense instructions un er io aw, they allege no deprivation of federal rights and may not obtain habeas rehef. 'The
lower courts,lloWever, read respondents' habeas petitions to
state at least two constitutional claims. Respondents repeat
both of those claims here .
··.. . .. :".
~

.:

...

. ,A ·.·

. .,.. .

·· ~~

. .

: ,

.

. ..··

First, respondents argue that § 2901.05, which governs the
burden of proof in all criminal trials, implicitly designated absence of self-defense an element of the crimes charged
The latter analysis paralleled the reasoning of the panel that originally
decided the case. See Isaac v. Engle, 646 F. 2d 1122 (CA6 1980)'.
Four members of the court dissented from the en bane opinion. Two
judges would have found no constitutional violation and two would have
barred consideration of Isaac's claims under Wainwright v. Sykes , supra.
18
One judge dissented from this decision, indicating that Wainwright v.
Sykes, supra, barred Bell's claims.
17

.~ :.. ·. .:·

. .;
~. ~

.
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against them. Since Ohio defined its cril_!les in this manner,
respo.;ts cont~~~ our opinions inv:Tn re Winship, 397
U. S.
(1970); Kullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U. S. 684 (1975),
andLPatterson v. Ne?fi York, 432 U. S. 197 \1977), ~eguire the
prosecution to prove absence of self-defense beyond a reasonable
aoubt A plurality of the en bane Sfith Circuit seemed
'-.
to accept this argument in Isaac's appeal, finding that due
process required the State "to meet the burden that it chose
to assume." 646 F. 2d, at 1135.
w_e find t~is claim E.atently without merit. 19 Our opinions
suggest 1Iiat the prosecution's constitutional duty to negate
affirmative defenses may depend, at least in part, on the
manner in which the State defines the charged crime. Compare Mullaney v. Wilbur, supra, with Patterson v. New
York, supra. These decisions, however, do not suggest that
whenever a State requires the prosecution to prove a particular circumstance beyond a reasonable doubt, it has invariably
defined that circumstance as an element of the crime. A
State may want to assume the burden of disproving an affirmative de ense WI ou a so es1
mg a sence o the de20
~ment of the crime.
ue Process Clause

2

19

The State suggests that the ineffectiveness of this claim demonstrates
that respondents suffered no actual prejudice from their procedural default. We agree that the claim is insufficient to support habeas relief, but
,:·do not categotiz~ this· insufficiency as a lack of' prejudice. If a :state . pris~.
oner alleges no deprivation of a federal right, § 2254 is simply inapplicable.
It is unnecessary in such a situation to inquire whether the prisoner preserved his claim before the state courts.
w Definition of a crime's elements may have consequences under state
law other than allocation of the burden of persuasion. For example, the
Ohio Supreme Court interpreted § 2901.05(A) to require defendants to
come forward with some evidence of affirmative defenses. State v. Robinson, 47 Ohio St. 2d 103, 351 N. E. 2d 88 (1976). Defendants do not bear
the same burden with respect to the elements of a crime; the State must
prove those elements beyond a reasonable doubt even when the defendant
introduces no evidence. See, e. g., State v. Isaac, 44 Ohio Misc. 87,337 N.
E. 2d 818 (Munic. Ct. 1975). Moreover, while Ohio requires the trial court

j···.
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does not mandate that when a State treats absence of an "affirmative defense" as an "element" of the crime for one pur- ~
pose, it must do so for all purposes. The structure of Ohio's
Code suggests simply that the State decided to assist defendants by requiring the prosecution to disprove certain affirmative defenses. Absent concrete evidence that the Ohio
legislature or courts understood § 2901.05(A) to go further
than this, we decline to accept respondents' construction of
state law. While they attempt to cast their first claim in
constitutional terms, we believe that this claim does no more
than suggest that the instructions at respondents' trials may
have violated state law. 21
B
Respondents also allege that, even without considering
§ 29~e!...£.onstitutionally shift the bur_den of
proving self-defense to them. All of the crimes charged
agamsTtirem requfre a showing of purposeful or knowing behavior. These terms, according to respondents, imply a degree of culpability that is absent when a person acts in selfdefense. See Committee Comment to Ohio Rev. Code Ann.
§ 2901.21 (1975) ("generally, an offense is not committed unless a person . . . has a certain guilty state of mind at the
time of his act or failure [to act]"); State v. Clifton, 32 Ohio
·.:.

·:

·. · . . :-te·Charge the jUry o~ alleleiDentS.of"a ·cnm.e,

e: g·.; State·v:i3ridiJeman, 5i ·

Ohio App. 2d 105, 366 N. E. 2d 1378 (1977), vacated in part, 55 Ohio St. 2d
261, 381 N. E. 2d 184 (1978), it does not require explicit instructions on the
prosecution's duty to negate self-defense beyond a reasonable doubt.
State v. Abner, 55 Ohio St. 2d 251, 379 N. E. 2d 228 (1978).
21
We have long recognized that a "mere error of state law" is not a de. nial of due process. Gryger v. Burke, 334 U. S. 728, 731 (1948). If the
contrary were true, then "every erroneous decision by a state court .on
state law would come [to this Court] as a federal constitutional question."
Ibid. See also Beck v. Washington, 369 U. S. 541 , 554-555 (1962); Bishop
v. Mazurkiewicz, 634 F. 2d 724, 726 (CA3 1980); United States ex rel. Burnett v. Illinois, 619 F. 2d 668, 670-671 (CA7 1980).

.

.

.·· ~

.

~
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App. 2d 284, 286--287, 290 N. E. 2d 921, 923 (1972) ("one who
kills in self-defense does so without the mens rea that otherwise would render him culpable of the homicide"). In addition, Ohio punishes only actions that are voluntary, Ohio
Rev. Code Ann. § 2901.21(A)(1) (1975), and unlawful, State v.
Simon, No. 6262, p. 13 (Ct. App. Montgomery County, Ohio,
Jan. 16, 1980), modified on reconsideration (Jan. 22, 1980).
Self-defense, respondents urge, negates these elements of
criminal behavior. Therefore, once the defendant raises the
possibility of self-defense, respondents contend that the
State must disprove that defense as part of its task of establishing guilty mens rea, voluntariness, and unlawfulness.
The Due Process Clause, according to respondents' interpretation of Winship, Mullaney, and Patterson, forbids the
States from disavowing any portion of this burden. 22
This argument states a colorable constitutional claim.
Several courts have applied our Mullaney and Patterson
opinions to charge the prosecution with the constitutional
duty of proving absence of self-deFense. 23 Most OfEheseaeci-

l----------------------:::. ·

..

22
In further support of the claim that, § 2901.05 aside, due process requires the prosecution to prove absence of self-defense, respondent Bell
maintains that the States may not constitutionally punish actions taken in
If fundamental notions of due process prohibit
self-defense.
criminalization of actions taken in self-defense, Bell suggests, then absence
of self-defense is a vital element of every crime. See Jeffries & Stephan,
Defenses, Presumptiorrs, and Bur.den of Proofin the Criminal Law, 88·Yale . .
L. J . 1325, 1366--1379 (1979); Comment, Shifting the Burden of Proving
Self-Defense-With Analysis of Related Ohio Law, 11 Akron L. Rev. 717,
758-759 (1978); Note , The Constitutionality of Affirmative Defenses After
Patterson v. New York , 78 Colum. L. Rev. 655, 672-673 (1978); Note , Burdens of Persuasion in Criminal Proceedings: The Reasonable Doubt Standard After Patterson v. N ew York , 31 U. Fla. L. ~385 , 415-416 (1979).
23
E . g., Tennon v. R icketts, 642 F. 2d 161 CA5 1981); Holloway v.
McEl1·oy, 632 F. 2d 605 (CA5 19~
· rt. deni:e , 451 U. S. 1028 (1981);
Wynn v. Mahoney , 600 F . 2d 448 CA4) ert. denied , 444 U. S. 950 (1979);
Commonwealth v. Hilbert , 476 Pa. 88, 382 A. 2d 724 (1978). See also
Comment, 11 Akron L. Rev. , supra n. 22; Note, 78 Colum. L. Rev., supra
n. 22.

'.

:~· :
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sions adopt respondents' reasoning that due process commands the prosecution to prove absence of self-defense if that
defense negates an element, such as purposeful conduct, of
the charged crime. While other courts have rejected this
type of claim, 24 the controversy suggests that respondents'
second argument states at least a plausible constitutional
claim. We proceed, therefore, to determine whether re·spondents preserved this claim befo~ate court
d, if
not, o mqmre w et er the principles articulated i Wainumght v. Sy es, supra, ar cons1 eration of the claim in a
federal habeas proceeding. 25 - - -- - - - ~

E. g., Carter v. Jago, 637 F. 2d 449 (CA6 1980); Baker v. Muncy, 619
F. 2d 327 (CA4 1980).
25
As we recognized in Sykes, 433 U. S., at 78-79, the problem of waiver
is separate from the question whether a state prisoner has exhausted state
remedies. Section 2254(b) requires habeas applicants to exhaust those
remedies "available in the courts of the State." This requirement, however, refers only to remedies still available at the time of the federal petition. See Humphrey v. Cady, 405 U. S. 504, 516 (1972); Fay v. Noia, 372
U. S. 391, 435 (1963). Respondents, of course, long ago completed their
direct appeals. Ohio, moreover, provides only limited collateral review of
convictions; prisoners may not raise claims that could have been litigated
before judgment or on direct appeal. See Ohio Rev. Code Ann.
§ 2953.21(A) (1975); Collins v. Perini, 594 F. 2d 592 (CA6 1979); Keener v.
Ridenour, 594 F. 2d 581 (CA6 1979). Since respondents could have challenged the constitutionality of Ohio's traditional self-defense instruction at
... ... tljal or on direct appeal, we agree with the lo~~r courts that ~.tate collat. . . . ei'afreiiE~f is unavailabl~ to ~espondents and, therefore/ that they' have exhausted their state remedies with respect to this claim.
In addition to the claims discussed in text, respondents contend that
Ohio's failure to apply State v. Robinson retroactively to them violates the
Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses. Respondents' due process
claim asserts that Ohio has no rational reason for refusing to apply Robinson to all defendants tried after the effective date of§ 2901.05(A). Their
equal protection claim rests on the fact that the Ohio Supreme Court has
applied Robinson retroactively to defendants convicted in nonjury trials,
even when those defendants raised no burden-of-proof objection at trial.
See State v. Humphries , 51 Ohio St. 2d 95, 364 N. E. 2d 1354 (1977).
We do not believe respondents' habeas petitions fairly raise either of
24

. .. ..

~

'::

..

. . .· ..
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III
None of the respondents challenged the constitutionality of
the self-defense instruction at trial. 26 They thus violated
Ohio Rule Grim. Proc. 30, which requires contemporaneous
objections to jury instructions. Failure to comply with Rule
30 is adequate, under Ohio law, to bar appellate consideration
of an objection. See, e. g., State v. Humphries, 51 Ohio St.
2d 95, 364 N. E. 2d 1354 (1977); State v. Gordon, 28 Ohio St.
2d 45, 276 N. E. 2d 243 (1971). The Ohio Supreme Court has
enforced this bar against the very due process argument
raised here. State v. Williams, 51 Ohio St. 2d 112, 364 N.
E. 2d 1364 (1977), vacated in part and remanded, 438 U. S.
911 (1978). 27 We must determine, therefore, whether re-

·. ·

these claims. In particular, we find no trace of the equal protection argument in any of the proceedings below. We doubt, moreover, that respondents have properly exhausted available state remedies for these claims.
Respondents could not have known the type of retroactivity Ohio would
accord State v. Robinson until the Ohio Supreme Court decided
Humphries, supra. The latter decision was rendered on the same day
that the court refused to review Isaac's direct appeal and long after the
convictions of Bell and Hughes became final. Accordingly, respondents
did not have the opportunity on direct appeal to confront the Ohio courts
with the equal protection and due process problems Humphries allegedly
creates. Nor did the Ohio Supreme Court consider those problems in
Humphries. Under these circumstances, Ohio might allow respondents to
raise t~eir equal prote~tion and. due proce~& claims in a collateral proceeq- .
·· ing.
decline·, therefore, to address those ciaims at this time. See.Pi- ·
card v. Connor, 404 U. S. 270 (1971).
26
While respondent Bell does not deny his procedural default, he argues
that we should overlook it because the State did not raise the issue in its
initial filings with the District Court. In some cases a State's plea of default
may come too late to bar consideration of the prisoner's constitutional
claim. E. g., Estelle v. Smith, 451 U.S. 454, 468 n. 12 (1981); Jenkins v.
Anderson, 447 U. S. 231, 234 n. 1 (1980). In this case, however, both the
District Court and Court of Appeals evaluated Bell's default. Prudential
considerations, therefore, do not deter us from also reaching the issue.
See Jenkins, supra, at 234 n. 1.
27
In Isaac's own case, the Ohio Court of Appeals refused to entertain his

·we
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spondents may litigate, in a federal habeas proceeding, a constitutional claim that they forfeited before the state courts.
A

The writ of habeas corpus indisputably holds an honored
position in our jurisprudence. Tracing its roots deep into
English common law, 28 it claims a place in Article I of our
Constitution. 29 Today, as in prior centuries, the writ is a
bulwark against convictions that violate "fundamental fairness." Wainwright v. Sykes, supra, at 97 (STEVENS, J.,
concurring).
We have always recognized, however, that the Great Writ
entails significant costs. 3° Collateral review of a conviction

.

.

~.

:

... . ·.

challenge to the self-defense instruction because of his failure to comply
with Rule 30. The Ohio Supreme Court subsequently dismissed Isaac's
appeal for lack of a substantial constitutional question. It is unclear
whether these appeals raised a constitutional, or merely statutory, attack
on the self-defense instruction used at Isaac's trial. If Isaac presented his
constitutional argument to the state courts, then they determined, on the
very facts before us, that the claim was waived.
Relying upon State v. Long, 53 Ohio St. 2d 91, 372 N. E. 2d 804 (1978),
respondents argue that the Ohio Supreme Court has recognized its power,
under Ohio's plain-error rule, to excuse Rule 30 defaults. Long, however,
does not persuade us that the Ohio courts would have excused respondents'
defaults. First, the Long court stressed that the plain-error rule applies
only i1;1 "exceptional circumstances," SU\!h as where, "but for the error, the
. ' . ;· . . ..' outcotn~ the trhi.l· dearly' would have' been otherwise:" jd:·, at' 96, 97,
372 N. E. 2d, at 807, 808. Second, the Long decision itself refused to invoke the plain-error rule for a defendant who presented a constitutional
claim identical to the one pressed by respondents.
"'See 3 W. Blackst
Commentaries *129-*138; Secretary of State for
Home Affairs v Brien,1 3] A. C. 603 (H. L.).
29
Art. I, § 9, cl. 2.
30
J udge~nry J . Friendly: put the matter well when he wrote that
"[t]he pro erbial man from ars would surely think we must consider our
system of c · ina! justice rribly bad if we are willing to tolerate such efforts at undoingfua ents of conviction." Friendly, Is Innocence Irrelevant? Collateral Attack on Criminal Judgments, 38 U. Chi. L. Rev. 142,

or

. ·~
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extends the ordeal of trial for both society and the accused.
As Justice Harlan once observed, "[b]oth the individual criminal defendant and society have an interest in insuring that
there will at some point be the certainty that comes with an
end to litigation, and that attention will ultimately be focused
not on whether a conviction was free from error but rather on
whether the prisoner can be restored to a useful place in the
community." Sanders v. United
es, 373 U. S. 1, 24-25
(Harlan, J., dissenting). See so Hank
n v. North Carolina, 432 U. S. 233, 247 (19 ) (POWELL, J. concurring in the
judgment). By frustratin these inte ts, the writ under· of litigation. 31
mines the usual principles of
Liberal allowance of the writ, moreover, degrades the
prominence of the trial itself. A criminal trial concentrates
society's resources at one "time and place in order to decide,
within the limits of human fallibility, the question of guilt or
innocence." Wainwright v. Sykes, supra, at 90. Our Constitution and laws surround the trial with a multitude of protections for the accused. Rather than enhancing these safeguards, ready availability of habeas corpus may diminish
their sanctity by suggesting to the trial participants that
there may be no need to adhere to those safeguards during
the trial itself.
We must also acknowledge that writs of habeas corpus frequently cost society the right to punish admitted offenders .
. . . . .. . ,.- · ....,· J:>.a~sage of time, ,.erosipn of memory, and dispersion ..of .w.it.,
..
nesses may render retrial difficult, even impossible. While a .

---

·..

.

•

.

•l

~.

145 (1970).
3
'Judge Friendly and Professor Bator suggest that this absence of finality also frustrates deterrence and rehabilitation. Deterrence depends
upon the expectation that "one violating the law will swiftly and certainly
become subject to punishment, just punishment." Rehabilitation demands that the convicted defendant realize "that he is justly subject to
sanction, that he stands in need of rehabilitation." Bator, Finality in
Criminal Law and Federal Habeas Corpus for State Prisoners, 76 Harv. L.
Rev. 441, 452 (1963); Friendly, supra n. 30, at 146.

I ~
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habeas writ may, in theory, entitle the defendant only toretrial, in practice it may reward the accused with complete
freedom from prosecution.
Finally, the Great Writ imposes special costs on our federal
system. The States possess primary authority for defining
and enforcing the criminal law. In criminal trials they also
hold the initial responsibility for vindicating constitutional
rights. Federal intrusions into state criminal trials frustrate
both the States' sovereign power to punish offenders and
their good faith attempts to honor constitutional rights. 32
In Wainwright v. Sykes, we recognized that these costs
are particularly high when a trial default has barred a prisoner from obtaining adjudication of his constitutional claim in
the state courts. In that situation, the trial court has had no
opportunity to correct the defect and avoid problematic retrials. The defendant's counsel, for whatever reasons, has detracted from the trial's significance by neglecting to raise a
claim in that forum. 33 The state appellate courts have not
had a chance to mend their own fences and avoid federal intrusion. Issuance of a habeas writ, finally, exacts an extra
charge by undercutting the State's ability to enforce its procedural rules. These considerations supported our Sykes
ruling that, when a procedural default bars state litigation of
a constitutional claim, a state prisoner may not obtain federal
habeas relief absent a showing of cause and actual prejudice.
't, · .

~ :. 4' :·. .

.i

·:. ; . . . . . .
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32
During the last two decades, our constitutional jurisprudence has recognized numerous new rights for criminal defendants. Although some habeas writs correct violations of long-established constitutional rights, others vindicate more novel claims. State courts are understandably
frustrated when they faithfully apply existing constitutional law only to
have a federal court discover, during a § 2254 proceeding, new constitutional commands.
33
Counsel's default may stem from simple ignorance or the pressures of
trial. We noted in Sykes, however, that a defendant's counsel may deliberately choose to withhold a claim in order to "sandbag''-to gamble on acquittal while saving a dispositive claim in case the gamble doesn't pay off.
See 433 U. S., at 89--90.
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Respondents urge that we should limit Sykes to cases in
which the constitutional error did not affect the truthfinding
function of the trial. In Sykes itself, for example, the prisoner alleged that the State had violated the rights guaranteed by Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U. S. 436 (1966). While
this defect was serious, it did not affect the determination of
guilt at trial.
We do not believe, however, that the principles of Sykes
lend themselves to this limitation. The costs outlined above
do not depend upon the type of claim raised by the prisoner.
While the nature of a constitutional claim may affect the calculation of cause and actual prejudice, it does not alter the
need to make that threshold showing. We reaffirm, there-l
fore, that any prisoner bringing a constitutional claim to the
federal courthouse after a state procedural default must demonstrate cause and actual prejudice before obtaining relief.

j

'

~

·. ... ·

....

... ·.
~

B
Respondents seek cause for their defaults in two circumstances. First, they urge that they could not have known at
the time of their trials that the Due Process Clause addresses
the burden of proving affirmative defenses. Second, they
contend that any objection to Ohio's self-defense instruction
would have been futile since Ohio had long required criminal
defendants to bear the burden of proving this affirmative
····:····.c:: deferise·. · ·.:.- ·. ·.. ...... ··: · ···. ·. <·. '>·· · ·:.··· ,·~
~ • . . ,:, ..... ;.•.
We note at the outset that the futility of presenting an
objection to the state courts cannot alone constitute cause for
a failure to object at trial. If a defendant perceives a viable
constitutional claim and believes it may find favor in the federal courts, he may not bypass the state courts simply because he thinks they will be unsympathetic to the claim.
;j.j

/

See E stelle v. Williams, 425 U.S. 501 , 515 (1976) (POWELL, J. , concurring) (the policy disfavoring inferred waivers of constitutional rights
"need not be carried to the length of allowing counsel for a defendant deliberately to forgo objection to a curable trial defect, even though he is aware
34

y
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Even a state court that has previously rejected a constitutional argument may decide, upon reflection, that the contention is valid. . Allowing criminal defendants to deprive the
state courts of this opportunity would contradict the principles supporting Sykes. 35
Respondents' claim, however, is not simply one of futility.
They further allege that, at the time they were tried, they
could not know that Ohio's self-defense instructions raised
constitutional questions. A criminal defendant, they urge,
may not waive constitutional objections unknown at the time
of trial.
We need not decide whether the novelty of a constitutional
claim ever establishes cause for a failure to object. 36 We
might hesitate to adopt a rule that would require trial counsel
either to exercise extraordinary vision or to object to every
aspect of the proceedings in the hope that some aspect mign
mask a latent constitutional claim. On the other hand, later
discovery of a constitutional defect unknown at the time of
trial does not invariably render the original trial fundamentally unfair. 37 These concerns, ·however, need 'not detain

. . •:

·· . ··· ·..: . . : .

of the factual and legal basis for an objection, simply because he thought
objection would be futile"); Myers v. Washington, 646 F. 2d 355, 364 (CA9
1981) (Poole, J., dissenting) (futility cannot constitute cause if it means
simply that a claim was "unacceptable to that particular court at that par·.'.· . . .. · ... ticula:r time''), :cert-:: pen~ing, ..N9·: 81-1.056. · : :·: ; ·.- :: . · ···: ...... ·... · .;.. ,
35
:
.
In fact, the decision to withhold ·a known constitutional claim resembles the type of deliberate bypass condemned in Fay v. Noia , 372 U. S. 391
(1963). Since the cause and prejudice standard is more demanding than
Fay's deliberate bypass requirement, see Sykes, supra, at 87, we are confident that perceived futility alone cannot constitute cause.
36
The State stressed at oral argument before this Court that it does not
seek such a ruling. Instead, Ohio urges merely that "when the tools are
available to construct the argument, ... you can charge counsel with the
obligation of raising that argument." Transcript at 8-9.
37
See Mackey v. United States, 401 U. S. 667, 675-702 (1971) (separate
opinion of Harlan, J.); Williams v. United States, 401 U. S. 646, 665-666
(1971) (MARSHALL, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part);
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us here since respondents' claims were far from unknown at
the time of their trials.
In re Winship, 397 U. S. 358 (1970), decided four-and-onehalf years before the first of respondents' trials, laid the basis
for their constitutional claim. In Winship we held that "the
Due Process Clause protects the accused against conviction
except upon proof beyond a reasonable doubt of every fact
necessary to constitute the crime with which he is charged."
I d., at 364. During the five years following this decision, 38
dozens of defendants relied upon this language to challenge
the constitutionality of rules requiring them to bear a burden
of proof. 39 In most of these cases, the defendants' claims
Hankerson v. North Carolina, 432 U. S. 233, 246-248 (1977) (POWELL, J.,
concurring in the judgment).
38
Even before Winship, criminal defendants and courts perceived that
placing a burden of proof on the defendant may violate due process. For
example, in Stump v. Bennett, 398 F. 2d 111 (CA8 1968), cert. denied, 393
U. S. 1001 (1968), the Eighth Circuit ruled en bane that an Iowa rule requiring defendants to prove alibis by a preponderance of the evidence violated du~ process. The court, moreover, observed: "That an oppressive
shifting of the burden of proof to a criminal defendant violates due process
is not a new doctrine within constitutional law." !d., at 122. See also
Johnson v. Bennett, 393 U. S. 253 (1968) (vacating and remanding lower
court decision for reconsideration in light of Stump); State v. Nales , 28
Conn. Supp. 28, 248 A. 2d 242 (1968) (holding that due process forbids re. quiring defendant to prove "lawful excuse" for possession of housebreaking
.. : · .... . i ·, ·. -:· =:,.,,:tools). · ·.: · .· . .- ·:· ··_·; ·_ ..·.:. ·'' : ··. ·

. · ·.-, ···.-.. . . .-,. .. .··:_. -_.
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See, e. g., State v. Commenos, 461 S. W. 2d 9 (Mo. 1970) (en bane)
(intent to return allegedly stolen item); Phillips v. State, 86 Nev. 720, 475
P. 2d 671 (1970) (insanity), cert. denied, 403 U. S. 940 (1971); Commonwealth v. O'Neal, 441 Pa. 17, 271 A. 2d 497 (1970) (absence of malice);
Commonwealth v. Vogel, 440 Pa. 1, 268 A. 2d 89 (1970) (insanity), overruled, Commonwealth v. Rose, 457 Pa. 380, 321 A. 2d 880 (1974); Smith v.
Smith, 454 F . 2d 572 (CA5 1971) Utlibi), cert. denied, 409 U. S. 885 (1972);
United States v. Braver, 450 F. 2d 799 (CA2 1971) (inducement), cert. denied, 405 U. S. 1064 (1972); Wilbur v. Robbins, 349 F. Supp. 149 (Me.
1972) (heat of passion), aff'd sub nom. Wilbur v. Mullaney, 473 F. 2d 943
(CAl 1973), vacated, 414 U. S. 1139 (1974), on remand, 496 F. 2d 1303
(CA11974), aff'd, 421 U. S. 684 (1975); State v. Cuevas, 53 Haw. 110, 488
39

·, · .. .-·:
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countered well-established principles of law. Nevertheless,
numerous courts agreed that the Due Process Clause requires the prosecution to bear the burden of disproving certain affirmative defenses. 40 In light of this activity, we cannot say that respondents lacked the tools to construct their
constitutional claim. 41

•

..
.. ·.

P. 2d 322 (1971) (lack of malice aforethought or presence of legal justification); State v. Brown, 163 Conn. 52, 301 A. 2d 547 (1972) (possession of license to deal in drugs), overruled on other grounds, State v. Whistnant,
179 Conn. 576, 427 A. 2d 414 (1980); In re Foss , 10 Cal. 3d 910, 519 P. 2d
1073, 112 Cal. Rptr. 649 (1974) (en bane) (entrapment); Woods v. State, 233
Ga. 347, 211 S. E. 2d 300 (1974) (authority to sell narcotic drugs), appeal
dismissed, 422 U. S. 1002 (1975); State v. Buzynski, 330 A. 2d 422 (Me.
1974) (mental disease); People v. Jordan, 51 Mich. App. 710, 216 N. W. 2d
71 (1974) (absence of intent), disapproved on other grounds, People v.
Johnson, 407 Mich. 196, 284 N. W. 2d 718 (1979); Commonwealth v. Rose,
457 Pa. 380, 321 A. 2d 880 (1974) (intoxication); Retail Credit Co. v. Dade
County, 393 F. Supp. 577 (SD Fla. 1975) (maintenance of reasonable procedures); Fuentes v. State, 349 A. 2d 1 (Del. 1975) (extreme emotional distress), overruled, State v. Moyer, 387 A. 2d 194 (Del. 1978); Henderson v.
State , 234 Ga. 827, 218 S. E. 2d 612 (1975) (self-defense); State v. Grady,
276 Md. 178, 345 A. 2d 436 (1975) (alibi); E vans v. State , 28 Md. App. 640,
349 A. 2d 300 (1975) (absence of malice; further describing in detail that
due process requires prosecution to negate most affirmative defenses, including self-defense), aff'd, 278 Md. 197, 362 A. 2d 629 (1976); State v. Robinson, 48 Ohio App. 2d 197, 356 N. E. 2d 725 (1975) (self-defense), aff'd, 47
Ohio St. 2d 103,351 N. ·E. 2d 88 (1976). See also Trimble v. State, 229 Ga.
· · · . · •···.. ·,·. 399'; 191 S. K 2d 857 (1972) ·(alibi),· overruled, Patterson v:: State; 233 Ga:."..
·
724, 213 S. E. 2d 612 (1975); Grace v. State, 231 Ga. 113, 118, 125-128, 200
S. E. 2d 248, 252, 256-258 (1973) (dissenting opinions) (insanity).
Several commentators also perceived that Winship might alter traditional burdens of proof for affirmative defenses . E . g., W. LaFave & A.
Scott, Handbook on Criminal Law § 8, pp. 46-51 (1972); The Supreme
Court 1969 Term, 84 Harv. L. Rev. 1, 159 (1970); Student Symposium, 33
Ohio St. L. J., supra n. 2, at 421; Comment, Due Process and Supremacy
as Foundations for the Adequacy Rule: The Remains of Federalism After
Wilbur v. Mullaney, 26 U. Me. L. Rev. 37 (1974).
'" Even those decisions rejecting the defendant's claim, of course, show
that the issue had been perceived by other defendants and that it was a live
one in the courts at the time.
"Respondent Isaac even had the benefit of our opinion in Mullaney v.

. ...
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We do not suggest that every competent counsel would
have relied upon Winship to assert the unconstitutionality of
a rule saddling criminal defendants with the burden of proving an affirmative defense. Every trial presents a myriad of
possible claims. A competent counsel might have overlooked respondents' due process argument while pursuing
other avenues of defense. We have long recognized, however, that the Constitution guarantees criminal defendants
only a fair trial and a competent attorney. It does not insure
that defense counsel will recognize and raise every conceivable constitutional claim. Where the basis of a constitutional
claim is available, and other defense counsel have perceived
and litigated that claim, the demands of comity and finality
counsel against labelling alleged unawareness of the objection
as cause for a procedural default. 42

... ·.·.··.;

.... . .

:

": .

:.

·-:

Wilbur, supra, decided three months before his trial. In Mullaney we invalidated a Maine practice requiring criminal defendants to negate malice
by proving that they acted in the heat of passion. We thus explicitly acknowledged the link between Winship and constitutional limits on assignment of the burden of proof. Cf. Lee v. Missouri, 439 U. S. 461, 462
(1979) (per curiam) (suggesting that defendants who failed, after Taylor v.
Louisiana, 419 U. S. 522 (1975), to object to the exclusion of women from
juries must show cause for the failure).
Respondents argue at length that, before the Ohio Supreme Court's decision in State v. Robinson, supra, they did not know that Ohio Rev. Code
Ann. § 2901.05(A) c~anged the traditional burden of proof. Ohio's inter. .· pretation: of§ 29ot:05(A), however, :is relevant only to claims that we 'reject
independently of respondents' procedural default. See supra, at 10-12;
n. 25, supra.
2
' Respondents resist this conclusion by noting that Hankerson v. North
Carolina, 432 U. S. 233, 243 (1977), gave Mullaney v. Wilbur, the opinion
explicitly recognizing Winship's effect on affirmative defenses , "complete
retroactive effect." Hankerson itself, however, acknowledged the distinction between the retroactive availability. of a constitutional decision and the
right to claim that availability after a procedural default. JUSTICE WHITE's
majority opinion forthrightly suggested that the States "may be able to insulate past convictions [from the effect of Mullaney] by enforcing the normal and valid rule that failure to object to a jury instruction is a waiver of
any claim of error." 432 U. S., at 244 n. 8. In this case we accept the

·.:.:

.· .··.··
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c
Respondents, finally, urge that we should replace or supplement the cause-and-prejudice standard with a plain-error
inquiry. We rejected this argument when pressed by a federal prisoner, see United States v. Frady, No. 80--1595, and
find it no more compelling here. The federal courts apply a
plain-error rule for direct review of federal convictions.
Fed. Rule Crim. Proc. 52(b). Federal habeas challenges to
state convictions, however, entail greater finality problems
and special comity concerns. We remain convinced that the
burden of justifying federal habeas relief for state prisoners
is "greater than the showing required to establish plain error
on direct appeal." Henderson v. Kibbe, 431 U. 8. 145, 154
(1977); United States v. Frady, supra, at - - . 43
Contrary to respondents' assertion, moreover, a plain-error standard is unnecessary to correct miscarriages of justice. The terms "cause" and "actual prejudice" are not rigid
concepts; they take their meaning from the principles of comity and finality discussed above. In appropriate cases those
force of that language as applied to defendants tried after Winship.
Since we conclude that these respondents lacked cause for their default,
we do not consider whether they also suffered actual prejudice. Respondents urge that their prejudice was so great that it should permit relief
even in the absence of cause. Sykes, however, stated these criteria in the
··.· .. .. · !:Qnju~ctiv.e al}~ ..~he.: facts o.f tl)is . ca~e. .dq .not p~~uade us to depart from
that approach:· ·
·
· · · · · · · · '..
:
·
..a Respondents bolster their plain-error contention by observing that
Ohio will overlook a procedural default if the trial defect constituted plain
error. Ohio, however, has declined to exercise this discretion to review
the type of claim pressed here. Seen. 27, supra. If Ohio had exercised
its discretion to consider respondents' claim, then their initial default
would no longer block federal review. See Mullaney v. Wilbur, supra, at
688 n: 7; County Court of Ulster County v. Allen, 442 U. S. 140, 147-154
(1979). Our opinions, however, make clear that the States have the primary responsibility to interpret and apply their plain error-rules. Certainly we should not rely upon a state plain-error rule when the State has
refused to apply that rule to the very sort of claim at issue.

.....
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principles must yield to the imperative of a fundamentally unjust incarceration. Since we are confident that victims of a
fundamental miscarriage of justice will meet the cause-and. prejudice standard, see Wainwright v. Sykes, supra, at 91;
id., at 94-97 (STEVENS, J., concurring), we decline to adopt
the more vague inquiry suggested by the words "plain
error."
IV
Close analysis of respondents' habeas petitions reveals only
one colorable constitutional claim. Because respondents
failed to comply with Ohio's procedures for raising that contention, and because they have not demonstrated cause for
the default, they are barred from asserting that claim under
28 U. S. C. § 2254. The judgments of the Court of Appeals
are reversed and remanded for proceedings consistent with
this opinion.

So ordered.
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To:

Justice Powell

From:
Re:

David
Engle v. Isaac---No. 80-1430

I recommend you join Jusitce O'Connor's opinion.

This is really a masterful and canny opinion. {

J ·~)

The key to the opinion is in Part IIA.
bit

troubled

by
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section
the

on

first

reasoning

of

In

reading.
the

CA6

to

I was a

that

Justice O'Connor

finds

be

without merit."

The CA had found on an analogy to Mullaney,

Part,

"patently
that

once the state had assigned itself the burden of proving absence of
self-defense, due process required that it in fact bear that burden.
Just as the Court in Mullaney required the state to bear the burden
of proving the elements of the crime the state defined, so, too, due
process

requires

the

state

to

assign that burden to itself:

bear

the

burden

if

it

chooses

to

"From the point of view of fairness

and due process, there is no practical difference between requiring
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patently

think
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wrong.
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think
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that
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claim

the
was

and that Justice 0' Connor could either have gone on to

reach the merits of the claim--as in effect she does--or could have
reached the cause and prejudice question as to this claim as well.
Of course I can well understand why Justice O'Connor wished to get
rid of the claim without reaching cause and prejudice--this was the
one claim as

to which Isaac might have had "cause."

Still I

puzzled why she felt to treat the claim quite so lightly.
she

thought

it

would

make
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look

am

Perhaps
somewhat

inconsistent if she treated this first claim as colorable but went
on to decide its ultimate merits rather than deciding the cause and
prejudice question.
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have
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is,

in
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succeeding section she might

decide
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constitutional

reaching the "cause and prejudice" formulation.
this inconsistency would have been genuine;

claim without

I do not think that

I think that the Court

is free to kick these claims out either on cause and prejudice or
for

failure to raise a winning constitutional claim.

think any of

this matters enough to hold off

But I do not

joining--unless you

feel some urge to protect your position in Mullaney (although the CA
was really extending Mullaney).

You might suggest that it is a bit

harsh to characterize the claim as colorless or patently wrong.
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80-1430 - Engle v. Isaac, et al

Dear Sandra:
This is a personal supplement to my formal join note.
I like very much your opinions in both this case and Frady.
Engle is a difficult case in view of the peculiar Ohio
situation.

I think you wrote a deft and masterful opinion.

I make two comments, one simply as a matter of
information and the other a suggestion for your
consideration.
As the author of Mullaney, I was particularly
interested in the way you dealt with it.

Although I would

not have said - perhaps understandably - that the Mullaney
claim in Isaac was "patently without merit", I do agree that

there may be a difference - as you suggest - between an
"element of a crime" and "an affirmative defense", even
though the state has chosen to assume the burden of
disproving the latter.

I may write briefly in concurrence

if other Justices in dissent challenge your position on
Mullaney.

~

I particularly liked Part
habeas corpus.
interest to me.

~A
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in which you discussed

Its abuse has been a subject of special
Our views are entirely congruent.

If you

have not done so, you might take a look at my concurring
412

u.s.

218 250, and

your
ustice Paul Reardon.
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What I wrote in Bustamonte became the "law of the land"
11

in Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465 (1976).
authorship" may be motivating me, I d

think a citation to
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of your views.
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With or without ~addition, your opinions i i isaac
and Frady will add a significant measure of needed
rationality
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criminal justice system.
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Sincerely,

February 10, 1982

80-1430 - Engle v. Isaac, et al

Dear Sandra:
This is a personal supplement to my formal join note.
I like very much your opinions in both thi.s case and Frady.
Engle is a di ff icul t case i.n vlew of the peculiar Ohio
situation. I think you wrote a deft and masterful opinion.
I make two comments, one si.mply as a matter of information
and the other a suggestion for your consideration.
As the author of Mullaney, I was particularly
interested in the way you dealt with it. Although I would
not have said - perhaps understandably - that the ~4ullane*
claim in Isaac was "patently without merit", I do agree tat
there may be a difference - as you suggest - between an
"element of a crime" and "an affirmative defense", even
though the state has chosen to assume the burden of
disproving the latter. I may write briefly in concurrence
i.f other Justices in dissent challenge your position on
f'.1ullaney.
I particularly liked Part III A in which you discussed
habeas corpus. Its abuse has been a subject of special
interest to me. Our views are entirely congruent. If you
have not done so, you might take a look at my concurring
opinion in Schneckloth v. Bustamante, 412 u.s. 218 250, and
particularly pp. 262, 264. What I wrote in Bustamante
became the "law of the land" in Stone v. Powell, 428 u.s.
465 {1976). You may wish to cite these cases as they are
strongly supportive of your views.
With or without these additions, your opinions in Isaac
and Frad¥ ~~ill add a significant measure of needed
rational1tv to this area of our criminal justice system.
Sincerely,

Justice O'Connor
LFP/vde
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February 10, 1902
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Dear Sandra:
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Justi.ce O'Connor
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Re:
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Dear Sandra:
I will circulate a dissent in due course.
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Sincerely,
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Copies to the Conference
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Dear Sandra:
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Justice O'Connor
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February 10, 1982

i/
Re:
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Dear Sandra:
I await the dissent.
Sincerely,
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Justice O'Connor
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The Conference
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CHAMBERS OF

JUSTICE SANDRA DAY O'CONNOR

February 11, 1982

No. 80-1430

Engle v. Isaac

Dear Lewis,
Thank you for your letter concerning the
referenced case. I am delighted you have seen fit
to join the opinion.
Your suggestions are excellent. When I
circulate the next printed draft, I will add the
changes noted in the attached copy of pp. 11, 17 and
18.
Sincerely,

Justice Powell
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against them. Since Ohio defined its crimes in this manner,
respondents contend, our opinions in In re Winship, 397
U. S. 358 (1970); Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U. S. 684 (1975),
and Patterson v. New York, 432 U. S. 197 (1977), require the
prosecution to prove absence of self-defense beyond a reasonable doubt. A plurality of the en bane Sixth Circuit seemed
to accept this argument in Isaac's appeal, finding that due
process required the State "to meet the burden that it chose
to assume." 646 F. 2d, at 1135.
~--"""V~I.e-~a-t,fH£.re-Jfftii.'fH~:enttv without merit. 19 Our opinions
suggest that the prosecution's constitutional duty to negate
affirmative defenses may depend, at least in part, on the
manner in which the State defines the charged crime. Compare Mullaney v. Wilbur, supra, with Patterson v. New
York, supra. These decisions, however, do not suggest that
whenever a State requires the prosecution to prove a particular circumstance beyond a reasonable doubt, it has invariably
defined that circumstance as an element of the crime. A
State may want to assume the burden of disproving an affirmative defense without also designating absence of the defense an element of the crime. 20 The Due Process Clause
19
The State suggests that the ineffectiveness of this claim demonstrates
that respondents suffered no actual prejudice from their procedural default. We agree that the claim is insufficient to support habeas relief, but
. : "i: .. . , · , .- do not. categorize this.:h•sufficienc.y as a lack .of preju.dice. .If .a. state prisoner 'alleges no depri~ation of a federal right, § 2254 is simply inapplicable.
It is unnecessary in such a situation to inquire whether the prisoner preserved his claim before the state courts.
20
Definition of a crime's elements may have consequences under state
Jaw other than allocation of the burden of persuasion. For example, the
Ohio Supreme Court interpreted § 2901.05(A) to require defendants to
come forward with some evidence of affirmative defenses. State v. Robin·
son, 47 Ohio St. 2d 103, 351 N. E . 2d 88 (1976). Defendants do not bear
the same burden with respect to the elements of a crime; the State must
prove those elements beyond a reasonable doubt even when the defendant
introduces no evidence. See, e. g., State v. Isaac, 44 Ohio Misc. 87, 337 N.
E. 2d 818 (Munic. Ct. 1975). Moreover, while Ohio requires the trial court

. ..
~

crtiZel) . .,

':Jc.n~eC~IO'r' "

v.

V"' 'J[O.Y''V' ' ''"")

] 1 17\

v ·· ._, ,

m
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extends the ordeal of trial for both society and the accused.
As Justice Harlan once observed, "[b]oth the individual criminal defendant and society have an interest in insuring that
there will at some point be the certainty that comes with an
end to litigation, and that attention will ultimately be focused
not on whether a conviction was free from error but rather on
whether the prisoner can be restored to a useful place in the
community." Sanders v. United States, 373 U. S. 1, 24-25
(Harlan, J., dissenting). See also Hankerson v. North Carolina, 432 U. S. 233, 247 (1977) (POWELL, J., concurring in the
judgment). By frustrating these interests, the writ undermines the usual principles of finality of litigation. 31
Liberal allowance of the writ, moreover, degrades the
prominence of the trial itself. A criminal trial concentrates
society's resources at one "time and place in order to decide,
within the limits of human fallibility, the question of guilt or
innocence." Wainwright v. Sykes, supra, at 90. Our Constitution and laws surround the trial with a multitude of protections for the accused. Rather than enhancing these safeguards, ready availability of habeas corpus may diminish
their sanctity by suggesting to the trial participants that
there may be no need to adhere to those safeguards during
the trial itself.
We must also acknowledge that writs of habeas corpus frequently cost society the right to punish admitted offenders.
, :'·.-... Paf!s~ge of time, .erosion o.f ~emory, and dispersion of .wit- :;
. .
nesses may render retria( difficult, everi impossible. While a

[adc\i~cM ~ L'l· 3D . Stto.ri
V\ ec.o Ii v"t. > '1\0
\ ~tJ
o Y\.

17

145 (1970).
31
Judge Friendly and Professor Bator suggest that this absence of finality also frustrates deterrence and rehabilitation. Deterrence depends
upon the expectation that "one violating the law will swiftly and certainly
become subject to punishment, just punishment." Rehabilitation demands that the convicted defendant realize "that he is justly subject to
sanction, that he stands in need of rehabilitation. " Bator, Finality in
Criminal Law and Federal Habeas Corpus for State Prisoners, 76 Harv. L.
Rev. 441 , 452 (1963); Friendly, supra n. 30, at 146.

.....
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habeas writ may, in theory, entitle the defendant only toretrial, in practice it may reward the accused with complete
freedom from prosecution.
Finally, the Great Writ imposes special costs on our federal
system. The States possess primary authority for defining
and enforcing the criminal law. In criminal trials they also
hold the initial responsibility for vindicating constitutional
rights. Federal intrusions into state criminal trials frustrate
both the States' sovereign power to punish offenders and
their good faith attempts to honor constitutional right .32
In Wainwright v. Sykes, we recognized that these costs
are particularly high when a trial default has barred a prisoner from obtaining adjudication of his constitutional claim in
the state courts. In that situation, the trial court has had no
opportunity to correct the defect and avoid problematic retrials. The defendant's counsel, for whatever reasons, has detracted from the trial's significance by neglecting to raise a
claim in that forum. 33 The state appellate courts have not
had a chance to mend their own fences and avoid federal intrusion. Issuance of a habeas writ, ~nally, exacts an extra
charge by undercutting the State's ability to enforce its procedural rules. These considerations supported our Sykes
ruling that, when a procedural default bars state litigation of
a constitutional claim, a state prisoner may not obtain federal
habeas relief absent a showing of cause and actual prejudice.
,.

':_:•• 4_ ••••

-.. •

:. ·_:;;.,' : •••

During the last two decades, our constitutional jurisprudence has recognized numerous new rights for criminal defendants. Although some habeas writs correct violations of long-established constitutional rights, others vindicate more novel claims. State courts are understandably
frustrated when they faithfully apply existing constitutional law only to
have a federal court discover, during a § 2254 proceeding, new constitutional commands.
·
33
Counsel's default may stem from simple ignorance or the pressures of
trial. We noted in Sykes , however, that a defendant's counsel may deliberately choose to withhold a claim in order to "sandbag"-to gamble on acquittal while saving a dispositive claim in case the gamble doesn't pay off.
See 433 U. S., at 89-90.
32
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JUSTICE BYRON R. WHITE

February 16, 1982

Re:

80-1430 - Engle v. Isaac

Dear Sandra,
I had been inclined to reach the merits
of

the

colorable

constitutional

issue

identify and to reverse on that question.

you
I

am now content with your resolution and join
your opinion.
Sincerely yours,

Justice O'Connor
Copies to the Conference
cpm
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THE CHIEF JUSTICE

February 16, 1982
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No. 80 - 1430 - Engle v . Isaac

Dear Sandra :
I join .
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Justice O' Connor
Copies to the Conference
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March 11,

CHAMBERS OF

82

.JUSTICE HARRY A. BLACKMUN

Re:

No. 80-1430 - Engle v. Isaac

Dear Sandra:
You already have a Court for your opinion.
You have my
vote, too, if you could make the following changes.
Most of
them, I believe, are minor.
l.
Eliminate the word "initial" in the third line of
footnote 26 on page 15. The presence of this word seems to me
to suggest that the Sykes issue was raised sometime before the
District Court.
I believe that, in fact, the State did not
present the issue until the case reached the Court of Appeals.
2.
In the same footnote you reject Bell's contention that
the State waived its Sykes claim by presenting it for the fiist
time before the Court of Appeals. According to the petitioner,
however, Bell raises the State's waiver for the first time in
this Court.
Should not respondent's argument be answered on
that grotmd rather for "prudential considerations"?
It seems
somewhat anomalous to permit the State to prevail on the argument that Bell failed to object at trial when the State itself
is guilty of a similar default.
3.

Eliminate footnote 32 on page 18.

4.
Eliminate all of the text on page 23 except the last
sentence.
I believe that none of the respondents raises a
Sixth Amendment claim.
The material I suggest for deletion is
therefore dictum.
5.
Eliminate the second sentence of the first paragraph
on page 24.
Sincerely,

Justice O'Connor
cc: The Conference

'o: The Chie:f Justice
Justice Brennan ~
Jus tice White
Justice Marshall
Justice Blackmun
Justice Powell -Justice Rehnquist
Justice Stevens
From : Justice O'Connor
2nd DRAFT
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SUPREME COURT OF mE UNITED STATES
No. 80-1430

TED ENGLE, SUPERINTENDENT, CHILLICOTHE
CORRECTIONAL INSTITUTE, PETITIONER, v.
LINCOLN ISAAC
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF
APPEALS FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT
[February - , 1982]

JUSTICE O'CONNOR delivered the opinion of the Court.
In Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U. S. 72 (1977), we held that a
state prisoner, barred by procedural default from raising a
constitutional claim on direct appeal, could not litigate that
claim in a § 2254 habeas corpus 1 proceeding without showing
cause for and actual prejudice from the default. Applying
the principle of Sykes to this case, we conclude that respondents, who failed to comply with an Ohio rule mandating contemporaneous objections to jury instructions, may not challenge the constitutionality of those instructions in a federal
habeas proceeding.
I
Respondents' claims rest in part on recent changes in Ohio
criminal law. For over a century, the Ohio courts required
criminal defendants to carry the burden of proving self-de1
Title 28 U. S. C. § 2254(a) empowers "[t]he Supreme Court, a Justice
thereof, a circuit judge, or a district court" to "entertain an application for
a writ of .habeas corpus in behalf of a person in custody pursuant to the
judgment of a State court only on the ground that he is in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States." This
statutory remedy may not be identical in all respects to the common-law
writ of habeas corpus. See Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U. S. 72, 78 (1977).
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fense by a preponderance of the evidence. See State v.
Seliskar, 35 Ohio St. 2d 95, 298 N. E. 2d 582 (1973); Szalkai
v. State, 96 Ohio St. 36, 117 N. E. 12 (1917); Silvus v. State,
22 Ohio St. 90 (1871). A new criminal code, effective January 1, 1974, subjected all affirmative defenses to the following rule:
"Every person accused of an offense is presumed innocent until proven guilty beyond a reasonable doubt, and
the burden of proof is upon the prosecution. The burden of going forward with the evidence of an affirmative
defense is upon the accused." Ohio Rev. Code Ann.
§ 2901.05(A) (1975).
For more than two years after its enactment, most Ohio
courts assumed that this section worked no change in Ohio's
traditional burden-of-proof rules. 2 In 1976, however, the
Ohio Supreme Court construed the statute to place only the
burden of production, not the burden of persuasion, on the
defendant. Once the defendant produces some evidence of
self-defense, the state court ruled, the prosecutor must disprove self-defense beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. Robinson, 47 Ohio St. 2d 103, 351 N. E. 2d 88 (1976) (syllabus by
the court). 3 The present actions arose because Ohio tried
See, e. g., State v. Rogers , 43 Ohio St. 2d 28, 30,330 N. E. 2d 674,676
(1975) (noting that "self-defense is an affirmative defense , which must be
established by a preponderance of the evidence"), cert. denied , 423 U. S.
1061 (1976). But see State v. Matthews, No. 74AP-428, p. 9 (Ct. App.
Franklin County, Ohio, Dec. 24, 1974) (§ 2901.05(A) "evinces a legislative
intent to change the burden of the defendant with respect to affirmative
defenses"); 1 0. Schroeder & L. Katz, Ohio Criminal Law and Practice
§ 2901.05, p. 14 (1974 ed.) ("The provisions of 2901.05(A) follow the modern
statutory trend in this area, requiring the accused to raise the affirmative
defense, but leaving the burden of persuasion upon the prosecution. "); Student Symposium: The Proposed Ohio Criminal Code-Reform and Regression, 33 Ohio St. L. J. 351, 420 (1972) (suggesting that legislators intended
to change traditional rule).
3
In Ohio, the court's syllabus contains the controlling law. See Haas
2

..
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and convicted respondents after the effective date of
§ 2901.05(A), but before the Ohio Supreme Court's interpretation of that statute in Robinson. 4
On December 16, 1974, an Ohio grand jury indicted respondent Hughes for aggravated murder. 5 At trial the State
showed that, in the presence of seven witnesses, Hughes
shot and killed a man who was keeping company with his former girlfriend. Prosecution witnesses testified that the victim was unarmed and had just attempted to shake hands with
Hughes. Hughes, however, claimed that he acted in self-defense. His testimony suggested that he feared the victim, a
larger man, because he had touched his pocket while approaching Hughes. The trial court instructed the jury that
Hughes bore the burden of proving this defense by a preponv. State, 103 Ohio St. 1, 7-8, 132 N. E. 158, 159-160 (1921).
'Two years after Robinson, the Ohio legislature once again amended
Ohio's burden of proof law. The new§ 2901.05(A), effective November 1,
1978, provides:
"Every person accused of an offense is presumed innocent until proven
guilty beyond a reasonable doubt, and the burden of proof for all elements
of the offense is upon the prosecution. The burden of going forward with
the evidence of an affirmative defense, and the burden of proof, by a preponderance of the evidence, for an affirmative defense, is upon the accused." Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 2901.05(A) (Supp. 1980) (emphasis
added).
This amendment has no effect on the litigation before us. Thoughout this
opinion, citations to § 2901. 05(A) refer to the statute in effect between January 1, 1974, and October 31, 1978.
5
See Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 2903.01 (1975):
"(A) No person shall purposely, and with prior calculation and design,
cause the death of another.
"(B) No person shall purposely cause the death of another while committing or attempting to commit, or while fleeing immediately after committing or attempting to commit kidnapping, rape, aggravated arson or arson,
aggravated robbery or robbery, aggravated burglary or burglary, or
escape.
"(C) Whoever violates this section is guilty of aggravated murder, and
shall be punished as provided in section 2929.02 of the Revised Code."
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derance of the evidence. Counsel for Hughes did not specifically object to this instruction. 6
On January 24, 1975, the jury convicted Hughes of voluntary manslaughter, a lesser included offense of aggravated
murder. 7 On September 24, 1975, the Summit County
Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction, and on March 19,
1976, the Supreme Court of Ohio dismissed Hughes' appeal,
finding no substantial constitutional question. 8 Neither of
these appeals challenged the jury instruction on self-defense.
Ohio tried respondent Bell for aggravated murder in April
1975. Evidence at trial showed that Bell was one of a group
of bartenders who had agreed to help one another if trouble
developed at any of their bars. On the evening of the murder, one of the bartenders called Bell and told him that he
feared trouble from five men who had entered his bar.
When Bell arrived at the bar, the bartender informed him
that the men had left. Bell pursued them and gunned one of
the men down in the street.
Bell defended on the ground that he had acted in self-de6
Hughes' counsel did register a general objection "to the entire Charge
in its entirety" because "[w]e are operating now under a new code in which
many things are uncertain." App. 48. Counsel's subsequent remarks,
however, demonstrated that his objection concerned only the proposed definitions of "Aggravated Murder, Murder and Voluntary Manslaughter."
App. 48, 50.
7
Voluntary manslaughter is "knowingly caus[ing] the death of another"
while under "extreme emotional stress brought on by serious provocation
reasonably sufficient to incite [the Defendant] into using deadly force."
Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 2903.03 (A) (1975).
Hughes was sentenced to 6-25 years in prison. The State's petition for
certiorari indicated that Hughes has been "granted final releas[e] as a matter of parole." Pet. for Cert. 6. This release does not moot the controversy between Hughes and the State. See Humphrey v. Cady, 405 U. S.
504, 506-507 n. 2 (1972); Carafas v. LaVallee, 391 U. S. 234, 237-240
(1968).
8
See State v. Hughes, C. A. No. 7717 (Ct. App. Summit County, Ohio,
Sept. 24, 1975); State v. Hughes , No. 75--1026 (Ohio, March 19, 1976).

80-1430---0PINION
ENGLE v. ISAAC

5

fense. He testified that as he approached two of the men,
the bartender shouted: "He's got a gun" or "Watch out, he's
got a gun." At this warning, Bell started shooting. As in
Hughes' case, the trial court instructed the jury that Bell had
the burden of proving self-defense by a preponderance of the
evidence. Bell did not object to this instruction and the jury
convicted him of murder, a lesser included offense of the
charged crime. 9
Bell appealed to the Cuyahoga County Court of Appeals,
but failed to challenge the instruction assigning him the burden of proving self-defense. The Court of Appeals affirmed
Bell's conviction on April 8, 1976. 10 Bell appealed further to
the Ohio Supreme Court, again neglecting to challenge the
self-defense instruction. That court overruled his motion for
leave to appeal on September 17, 1976," two months after it
construed § 2901.05(A) to place the burden of proving absence of self-defense on the prosecution. See State v. Robinson, supra.
Respondent Isaac was tried in September 1975 for felonious assault. 12 The State showed that Isaac had severely
beaten his former wife's boyfriend. Isaac claimed that the
boyfriend punched him first and that he acted solely in selfdefense. Without objection from Isaac, the court instructed
Ohio defines murder as "purposely caus[ing] the death of another."
Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 2903.02(A) (1975). Bell received a sentence of 15
years to life imprisonment.
10
State v. Bell, No. 34727 (Ct. App. Cuyahoga County, Ohio, April 8,
1976).
11
State v. Bell , No. 76-573 (Ohio, Sept. 17, 1976).
12
See Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 2903.11 (1975):
"(A) No person shall knowingly:
"(1) Cause serious physical harm to another;
"(2) Cause or attempt to cause physical harm to another by means of a
deadly weapon or dangerous ordnance as defined in section 2923.11 of the
Revised Code.
"(B) Whoever violates this section is guilty of felonious assault, a felony
of the second degree."
9
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the jury that Isaac carried the burden of proving this defense
by a preponderance of the evidence. The jury acquitted
Isaac of felonious assault, but convicted him of the lesser included offense of aggravated assault. 13
Ten months after Isaac's trial, the Ohio Supreme Court decided State v. Robinson, supra. In his appeal to the
Pickaway County Court of Appeals, 14 Isaac relied upon Robinson to challenge the burden of proof instructions given at
his trial. The court rejected this challenge because Isaac
had failed to object to the jury instructions during trial, as
required by Ohio Rule Crim. Proc. 30. 15 This default waived
Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 2903.12 (1975) describes aggravated assault:
"(A) No person, while under extreme emotional stress brought on by serious provocation reasonably sufficient to incite him into using deadly force
shall knowingly:
"(1) Cause serious physical harm to another;
"(2) Cause or attempt to cause physical harm to another by means of a
deadly weapon or dangerous ordnance as defined in section 2923.11 of the
Revised Code.
"(B) Whoever violates this section is guilty of aggravated assault, a felony of the fourth degree."
The judge sentenced Isaac to a term of six months to five years imprisonment. According to the State's petition for certiorari, Isaac has been released from jail. This controversy is not moot, however. Seen. 7, supra.
14
State v. Isaac, No. 346 (Ct. App. Pickaway County, Ohio, Feb. 11,
1977).
15
At the time Hughes and Bell were tried, this rule stated in relevant
part:
"No party may assign as error any portion of the charge or omission
therefrom unless he objects thereto before the jury retires to consider its
verdict, stating specifically the matter to which he objects and the grounds
of his objection. Opportunity shall be given to make the objection out of
the hearing of the jury."
Shortly before Isaac's trial, Ohio amended the language of the rule in minor
respects:
"A party may not assign as error the giving or the failure to give any
instructions unless he objects thereto before the jury retires to consider its
verdict, stating specifically the matter to which he objects and the grounds
13

''
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Isaac's claim. State v. Glaros, 170 Ohio St. 471, 166 N. E.
2d 379 (1960); State v. Slone, 45 Ohio App. 2d 24, 340 N. E.
2d 413 (1975).
The Supreme Court of Ohio dismissed Isaac's appeal for
lack of a substantial constitutional question. 16 On the same
day, that court decided State v. Humphries, 51 Ohio St. 2d
95, 364 N. E. 2d 1354 (1977), and State v. Williams, 51 Ohio
St. 2d 112, 364 N. E. 2d 1364 (1977), vacated in part andremanded, 438 U. S. 911 (1978). In Humphries the court
ruled that every criminal trial held on or after January 1,
1974, "is required to be conducted in accordance with the provisions of [Ohio Rev. Code Ann. §2901.05]." ld., at 95, 364
N. E. 2d, at 1355 (syllabus by the court). The court, however, refused to extend this ruling to a defendant who failed
to comply with Ohio Rule Crim. Proc. 30. ld., at 102-103,
364 N. E. 2d, at 1359. In Williams, the court declined to
consider a constitutional challenge to Ohio's traditional selfdefense instruction, again because the defendant had not
properly objected to the instruction at trial.
All three respondents unsuccessfully sought writs of habeas corpus from federal district courts. Hughes' petition
alleged that the State had violated the Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendments by failing to prove guilt "as to each and every
essential element of the offense charged" and by failing to "so
instruct" the jury. The District Judge rejected this claim,
finding that Ohio law does not consider absence of self-defense an element of aggravated murder or voluntary manslaughter.
Although the self-defense instructions at
Hughes' trial might have violated § 2901.05(A), they did not
violate the federal Constitution. Alternatively, the District
of his objection. Opportunity shall be given to make the objection out of
the hearing of the jury."
Both versions of the Ohio rule closely parallel Rule 30 of the Federal Rules
of Criminal Procedure.
16
State v. Isaac, No. 77-412 (Ohio, July 20, 1977).
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Judge held that Hughes had waived his constitutional claim
by failing to comply with Ohio's contemporaneous objection
rule. Since Hughes offered no explanation for his failure to
object, and showed no actual prejudice, Wainwright v.
Sykes, 433 U. S. 72 (1977), barred him from asserting the
claim. Hughes v. Engle, Civ. Action No. C77-156A (N. D.
Ohio, June 26, 1979).
Bell's petition for habeas relief similarly alleged that the
trial judge had violated due process by instructing "the jury
that the accused must prove an affirmative defense by a preponderance of the evidence." The District Court acknowledged that Bell had never raised this claim in the state
courts. Observing, however, that the State addressed Bell's
argument on the merits, the District Court ruled that Bell's
default was not a "deliberate bypass." See Fay v. Noia, 372
U. S. 391 (1963). Although the court cited our opinion in
Wainwright v. Sykes, supra, it did not inquire whether Bell
had shown cause for or prejudice from his procedural waiver.
The court then ruled that Ohio could constitutionally burden
Bell with proving self-defense since it had not defined absence of self-defense as an element of murder. Bell v.
Perini, No. C 78-343 (N.D. Ohio, Dec. 26, 1978).
Bell moved for reconsideration, urging that § 2901.05(A)
had in fact defined absence of self-defense as an element of
murder. The District Court rejected this argument and
then declared that the "real issue" was whether Bell was entitled to retroactive application of State v. Robinson, supra.
Bell failed on this claim as well since Ohio's decision to limit
retroactive application of Robinson "substantially further[ed]
the State's legitimate interest in the finality of its decisions."
App. to Pet. for Cert. A59. Indeed, the District Court
noted that this Court had sanctioned just this sort of limit on
retroactivity. See Hankerson v. North Carolina, 432 U. S.
233, 244 n. 8 (1977). Bell v. Perini, No. C 78-343 (N.D.
Ohio, Jan. 23, 1979).
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Isaac's habeas petition was more complex than those submitted by Hughes and Bell. He urged that the Ohio Supreme Court had "failed to give relief [to him], despite its
own pronouncement" that State v. Robinson would apply retroactively. In addition, h~ declared broadly that the Ohio
court's ruling was "contrary to the Supreme Court of the
United States in regard to proving self-defense." The District Court determined that Isaac had waived any constitutional claims by failing to present them to the Ohio trial
court. Since he further failed to show either cause for or actual prejudice from the waiver, see Wainwright v. Sykes,
supra, he could not present his claim in a federal habeas proceeding. Isaac v. Engle, Civ. Action No. C-2-78-278 (S.D.
Ohio, June 26, 1978).
The Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reversed all
three District Court orders. In Isaac v. Engle, 646 F. 2d
1129 (CA6 1980), a majority of the en bane court ruled that
Wainwright v. Sykes did not preclude consideration of Isaac's
constitutional claims. At the time of Isaac's trial, the court
noted, Ohio had consistently required defendants to prove affirmative defenses by a preponderance of the evidence. The
futility of objecting to this established practice supplied adequate cause for Isaac's waiver. Prejudice, the second prerequisite for excusing a procedural default, was "clear" since
the burden of proof is a critical element of factfinding, and
since Isaac had made a substantial issue of self-defense. I d.,
at 1134.
A majority of the court also believed that the instructions
given at Isaac's trial violated due process. Four judges
thought that § 2901.05(A) defined the absence of self-defense
as an element of felonious and aggravated assault. While
the State did not have to define its crimes in this manner,
"due process require[d] it to meet the burden that it chose to
assume." 646 F. 2d, at 1135. A fifth judge believed that,
even absent§ 2901.05(A), the Due Process Clause would com-
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pel the prosecution to prove absence of self-defense because
that defense negates criminal intent, an essential element of
aggravated and felonious assault. A sixth judge agreed that
Ohio had violated Isaac's due process rights, but would have
concentrated on the State's arbitrary refusal to extend the
retroactive benefits of State v. Robinson, supra, to Isaac. 17
Relying on the en bane decision in Isaac, two Sixth Circuit
panels ordered the District Court to release Bell and Hughes
unless the State chose to retry them within a reasonable
time. Bell v. Perini, 635 F. 2d 575 (CA6 1980);'8 Hughes v.
Engle, judgment order reported at 642 F. 2d 451 (CA6 1980).
We granted certiorari to review all three Sixth Circuit opinions. 451 U. S. 906 (1981).
II
A state prisoner is entitled to relief under 28 U. S. C.
§ 2254 only if he is held "in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States." Insofar
as respondents simply challenge the correctness of the selfdefense instructions under Ohio law, they allege no deprivation of federal rights and may not obtain habeas relief. The
lower courts, however, read respondents' habeas petitions to
state at least two constitutional claims. Respondents repeat
both of those claims here.

A
First, respondents argue that § 2901.05, which governs the
burden of proof in all criminal trials, implicitly designated absence of self-defense an element of the crimes charged
"The latter analysis paralleled the reasoning of the panel that originally
decided the case. See Isaac v. Engle, 646 F. 2d 1122 (CA6 1980).
Four members of the court dissented from the en bane opinion. Two
judges would have found no constitutional violation and two would have
barred consideration of Isaac's claims under Wainwright v. Sykes, supra.
18
One judge dissented from this decision, indicating that Wainwright v.
Sykes, supra, barred Bell's claims.
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against them. Since Ohio defined its crimes in this manner,
respondents contend, our opinions in In re Winship, 397
U. S. 358 (1970); Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U. S. 684 (1975),
and Patterson v. New York, 432 U. S. 197 (1977), require the
prosecution to prove absence of self-defense beyond a reasonable doubt. A plurality of the en bane Sixth Circuit seemed
to accept this argument in Isaac's appeal, finding that due
process required the State "to meet the burden that it chose
to assume." 646 F. 2d, at 1135.
A careful review of our prior decisions reveals that this
claim is without merit. 19 Our opinions suggest that the prosecution's constitutional duty to negate affirmative defenses
may depend, at least in part, on the manner in which the
State defines the charged crime. Compare Mullaney v. Wilbur, supra, with Patterson v. New York, supra. These decisions, however, do not suggest that whenever a State requires the prosecution to prove a particular circumstance
beyond a reasonable doubt, it has invariably defined that circumstance as an element of the crime. · A State may want to
assume the burden of disproving an affirmative defense without also designating absence of the defense an element of the
crime. 20 The Due Process Clause does not mandate that
19
The State suggests that the ineffectiveness of this claim demonstrates
that respondents suffered no actual prejudice from their procedural default. We agree that the claim is insufficient to support habeas relief, but
do not categorize this insufficiency as a lack of prejudice. If a state prisoner alleges no deprivation of a federal right-, § 2254 is simply inapplicable.
It is unnecessary in such a situation to inquire whether the prisoner preserved his claim before the state courts.
20
Definition of a crime's elements may have consequences under state
law other than allocation of the burden of persuasion. For example, the
Ohio Supreme Court interpreted § 2901.05(A) to require defendants to
come forward with some evidence of affirmative defenses. State v. Robinson, 47 Ohio St. 2d 103, 351 N. E. 2d 88 (1976). Defendants do not bear
the same burden with respect to the elements of a crime; the State must
prove those elements beyond a reasonable doubt even when the defendant
introduces no evidence. See, e. g., State v. Isaac, 44 Ohio Misc. 87, 337 N.
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when a State treats absence of an "affirmative defense" as an
"element" of the crime for one purpose, it must do so for all
purposes. The structure of Ohio's Code suggests simply
that the State decided to assist defendants by requiring the
prosecution to disprove certain affirmative defenses. Absent concrete evidence that the Ohio legislature or courts understood § 2901.05(A) to go further than this, we decline to
accept respondents' construction of state law. While they
attempt to cast their first claim in constitutional terms, we
believe that this claim does no more than suggest that the instructions at respondents' trials may have violated state
law. 21
B

Respondents also allege that, even without considering
§ 2901.05, Ohio could not constitutionally shift the burden of

proving self-defense to them. All of the crimes charged
against them require a showing of purposeful or knowing behavior. These terms, according to respondents, imply a degree of culpability that is absent when a person acts in selfdefense. See Committee Comment to Ohio Rev. Code Ann.
§ 2901.21 (1975) ("generally, an offense is not committed unless a person . . . has a certain guilty state of mind at the
E. 2d 818 (Munic. Ct. 1975). Moreover, while Ohio requires the trial court
to charge the jury on all elements of a crime, e. g., State v. Bridgeman, 51
Ohio App. 2d 105, 366 N. E. 2d 1378 (1977), vacated in part, 55 Ohio St. 2d
261, 381 N. E. 2d 184 (1978), it does not require explicit instructions on the
prosecution's duty to negate self-defense beyond a reasonable doubt.
State v. Abner, 55 Ohio St. 2d 251, 379 N. E. 2d 228 (1978).
21
We have long recognized that a "mere error of state law" is not a denial of due process. Gryger v. Burke, 334 U. S. 728, 731 (1948). If the
contrary were true, then "every erroneous decision by a state court on
state law would come [to this Court] as a federal constitutional question."
Ibid. See also Beck v. Washington, 369 U. S. 541, 554-555 (1962); Bishop
v. Mazurkiewicz, 634 F. 2d 724, 726 (CA3 1980); United States ex rel. Burnett v. Illinois, 619 F. 2d 668, 670--671 (CA7 1980).
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time of his act or failure [to act]"); State v. Clifton, 32 Ohio
App. 2d 284, 286-287, 290 N. E. 2d 921, 923 (1972) ("one who
kills in self-defense does so without the mens rea that otherwise would render him culpable of the homicide"). In addition, Ohio punishes only actions that are voluntary, Ohio
Rev. Code Ann. § 2901.21(A)(l) (1975), and unlawful, State v.
Simon, No. 6262, p. 13 (Ct. App. Montgomery County, Ohio,
Jan. 16, 1980), modified on reconsideration (Jan. 22, 1980).
Self-defense, respondents urge, negates these elements of
criminal behavior. Therefore, once the defendant raises the
possibility of self-defense, respondents contend that the
State must disprove that defense as part of its task of establishing guilty mens rea, voluntariness, and unlawfulness.
The Due Process Clause, according to respondents' interpretation of Winship, Mullaney, and Patterson, forbids the
States from disavowing any portion of this burden. 22
This argument states a colorable constitutional claim.
Several courts have applied our Mullaney and Patterson
opinions to charge the prosecution with the constitutional
duty of proving absence of self-defense. 23 Most of these deci22
In further support of the claim that, § 2901.05 aside, due process requires the prosecution to prove absence of self-defense, respondent Bell
maintains that the States may not constitutionally punish actions taken in
If fundamental notions of due process prohibit
self-defense.
criminalization of actions taken in self-defense, Bell suggests, then absence
of self-defense is a vital element of every crime. See Jeffries & Stephan,
Defenses, Presumptions, and Burden of Proof in the Criminal Law, 88 Yale
L. J. 1325, 1366-1379 (1979); Comment, Shifting the Burden of Proving
Self-Defense-With Analysis of Related Ohio Law, 11 Akron L. Rev. 717,
758-759 (1978); Note, The Constitutionality of Affinnative Defenses After
Patterson v. New York, 78 Colum. L. Rev. 655, 672-673 (1978); Note, Burdens of Persuasion in Criminal Proceedings: The Reasonable Doubt Standard After Patterson v. New York, 31 U. Fla. L. Rev. 385, 415-416 (1979).
23
E. g., Tennon v. Ricketts, 642 F. 2d 161 (CA5 1981); Holloway v.
McElroy, 632 F. 2d 605 (CA5 1980), cert. denied, 451 U. S. 1028 (1981);
Wynn v. Mahoney, 600 F. 2d 448 (CA4), cert. denied, 444 U. S. 950 (1979);
Commonwealth v. Hilbert, 476 Pa. 288, 382 A. 2d 724 (1978). See also
Comment, 11 Akron L. Rev., supra n. 22; Note, 78 Colum. L. Rev., supra

\
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sions adopt respondents' reasoning that due process commands the prosecution to prove absence of self-defense if that
defense negates an element, such as purposeful conduct, of
the charged crime. While other courts have rejected this
type of claim, 24 the controversy suggests that respondents'
second argument states at least a plausible constitutional
claim. We proceed, therefore, to determine whether respondents preserved this claim before the state courts and, if
not, to inquire whether the principles articulated in Wainwright v. Sykes, supra, bar consideration of the claim in a
federal habeas proceeding. 25
n. 22.
24
E. g., Carter v. Jago, 637 F. 2d 449 (CA6 1980); Baker v. Muncy, 619
F. 2d 327 (CA4 1980). See also Leland v. Oregon, 343 U. S. 790 (1952)
(rule requiring accused to prove insanity beyond a reasonable doubt does
not violate due process).
25
As we recognized in Sykes, 433 U. S., at 78-79, the problem of waiver
is separate from the question whether a state prisoner has exhausted state
remedies. Section 2254(b) requires habeas applicants to exhaust those
remedies "available in the courts of the State." This requirement, however, refers only to remedies still available at the time of the federal petition. See Humphrey v. Cady, 405 U. S. 504, 516 (1972); Fay v. Noia, 372
U. S. 391, 435 (1963). Respondents, of course, long ago completed their
direct appeals. Ohio, moreover, provides only limited collateral review of
convictions; prisoners may not raise claims that could have been litigated
before judgment or on direct appeal. See Ohio Rev. Code Ann.
§ 2953.21(A) (1975); Collins v. Perini, 594 F. 2d 592 (CA6 1979); Keener v.
Ridenour, 594 F. 2d 581 (CA6 1979). Since respondents could have challenged the constitutionality of Ohio's traditional self-defense instruction at
trial or on direct appeal, we agree with the lower courts that state collateral relief is unavailable to respondents and, therefore, that they have exhausted their state remedies with respect to this claim.
In addition to the claims discussed in text, respondents contend that
Ohio's failure to apply State v. Robinson retroactively to them violates the
Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses. Respondents' due process
claim asserts that Ohio has no rational reason for refusing to apply Robinson to all defendants tried after the effective date of§ 2901.05(A). Their
equal protection claim rests on the fact that the Ohio Supreme Court has
applied Robinson retroactively to defendants convicted in nonjury trials,
even when those defendants raised no burden-of-proof objection at trial.

I
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III
None of the respondents challenged the constitutionality of
the self-defense instruction at trial. 26 They thus violated
Ohio Rule Crim. Proc. 30, which requires contemporaneous
objections to jury instructions. Failure to comply with Rule
30 is adequate, under Ohio law, to bar appellate consideration
of an objection. See, e. g., State v. Humphries, 51 Ohio St.
2d 95, 364 N. E. 2d 1354 (1977); State v. Gordon, 28 Ohio St.
2d 45, 276 N. E. 2d 243 (1971). The Ohio Supreme Court has
enforced this bar against the very due process argument
raised here. State v. Williams, 51 Ohio St. 2d 112, 364 N.
E. 2d 1364 (1977), vacated in part and remanded, 438 U. S.
See State v. Humphries, 51 Ohio St. 2d 95, 364 N. E. 2d 1354 (1977).
We do not believe respondents' habeas petitions fairly raise either of
these claims. In particular, we find no trace of the equal protection argument in any of the proceedings below. We note, moreover, that respon- \
dents may not have properly exhausted available state remedies for these
claims. Respondents could not have known the type of retroactivity Ohio
would accord State v. Robinson until the Ohio Supreme Court decided
Humphries, supra. The latter decision was rendered on the same day
that the court refused to review Isaac's direct appeal and long after the
convictions of Bell and Hughes became final. Accordingly, respondents
did not have the opportunity on direct appeal to confront the Ohio courts
with the equal protection and due process problems Humphries allegedly
creates. Nor did the Ohio Supreme Court consider those problems in
Humphries. Under these circumstances, Ohio might allow respondents to
raise their equal protection and due process claims in a collateral proceed- \
ing. Because respondents' petitions do not clearly raise either of these issues, and because respondents may not have exhausted available state
remedies for those claims, we decline to address them at this time.
26
While respondent Bell does not deny his procedural default, he argues
that we should overlook it because the State did not raise the issue in its
filings with the District Court. In some cases a State's plea of default may
come too late to bar consideration of the prisoner's constitutional claim.
E. g., Estelle v. Smith, 451 U.S. 454, 468 n. 12 (1981); Jenkins v. Anderson, 447 U. S. 231, 234 n. 1 (1980). In this case, however, both the District urt and Court o ppeals evaluated Bell's default. Bell, moreover, '
did not make IS waiver' claim until he submitted his brief on the merits
to this Court. Accordingly, we decline to consider his argument.
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911 (1978). 27 We must determine, therefore, whether respondents may litigate, in a federal habeas proceeding, a constitutional claim that they forfeited before the state courts.
A

The writ of habeas corpus indisputably holds an honored
position in our jurisprudence. Tracing its roots deep into
English common law, 28 it claims a place in Article I of our
Constitution. 29 Today, as in prior centuries, the writ is a
bulwark against convictions that violate "fundamental fairness." Wainwright v. Sykes, supra, at 97 (STEVENS, J.,
concurring).
We have always recognized, however, that the Great Writ
entails significant costs. 3° Collateral review of a conviction
In Isaac's own case, the Ohio Court of Appeals refused to entertain his
challenge to the self-defense instruction because of his failure to comply
with Rule 30. The Ohio Supreme Court subsequently dismissed Isaac's
appeal for lack of a substantial constitutional question. It is unclear
whether these appeals raised a constitutional, or merely statutory, attack
on the self-defense instruction used at Isaac's trial. If Isaac presented his
constitutional argument to the state courts, then they determined, on the
very facts before us, that the claim was waived.
Relying upon State v. Long, 53 Ohio St. 2d 91, 372 N. E. 2d 804 (1978),
respondents argue that the Ohio Supreme Court has recognized its power,
under Ohio's plain-error rule, to excuse Rule 30 defaults. Long, however,
does not persuade us that the Ohio courts would have excused respondents'
defaults. First, the Long court stressed that the plain-error rule applies
only in "exceptional circumstances," such as where, "but for the error, the
outcome of the trial clearly would have been otherwise." !d., at 96, 97,
372 N. E. 2d, at 807, 808. Second, the Long decision itself refused to invoke the plain-error rule for a defendant who presented a constitutional
claim identical to the one pressed by respondents.
28
See 3 W. Blackstone, Commentaries *129-*138; Secretary of State for
Home Affairs v. O'Brien, [1923] A. C. 603 (H. 1.).
29
Art. I, § 9, cl. 2.
30
Judge Henry J. Friendly put the matter well when he wrote that
"[t]he proverbial man from Mars would surely think we must consider our
system of criminal justice terribly bad if we are willing to tolerate such ef27
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extends the ordeal of trial for both society and the accused.
As Justice Harlan once observed, "[b]oth the individual criminal defendant and society have an interest in insuring that
there will at some point be the certainty that comes with an
end to litigation, and that attention will ultimately be focused
not on whether a conviction was free from error but rather on
whether the prisoner can be restored to a useful place in the
community." Sanders v. United States, 373 U. S. 1, 24-25
(Harlan, J., dissenting). See also Hankerson v. North Carolina, 432 U. S. 233, 247 (1977) (POWELL, J., concurring in the
judgment). By frustrating these interests, the writ undermines the usual principles of finality of litigation. 31
Liberal allowance of the writ, moreover, degrades the
prominence of the trial itself. A criminal trial concentrates
society's resources at one "time and place in order to decide,
within the limits of human fallibility, the question of guilt or
forts at undoing judgments of conviction." Friendly, Is Innocence Irrelevant? Collateral Attack on Criminal Judgments, 38 U. Chi. L. Rev. 142,
145 (1970).
JUSTICE POWELL, elucidating a position that ultimately commanded a majority of the Court, similarly suggested:
"No effective judicial system can afford to concede the continuing theoretical possibility that there is error in every trial and that every incarceration is unfounded. At some point the law must convey to those in custody
that a wrong has been committed, that consequent punishment has been
imposed, that one should no longer look back with the view to resurrecting
every imaginable basis for further litigation but rather should look forward
to rehabilitation and to becoming a constructive citizen." Schneckloth v.
Bustamante, 412 U. S. 218, 262 (1973) (POWELL, J ., concurring) (footnote
omitted). See also Stone v. Powell, 428 U. S. 465 (1976).
31
Judge Friendly and Professor Bator suggest that this absence of finality also frustrates deterrence and rehabilitation. Deterrence depends
upon the expectation that "one violating the law will swiftly and certainly
become subject to punishment, just punishment." Rehabilitation demands that the convicted defendant realize "that he is justly subject to
sanction, that he stands in need of rehabilitation." Bator, Finality in
Criminal Law and Federal Habeas Corpus for State Prisoners, 76 Harv. L.
Rev. 441, 452 (1963); Friendly, supra n. 30, at 146.
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innocence." Wainwright v. Sykes, supra, at 90. Our Constitution and laws surround the trial with a multitude of protections for the accused. Rather than enhancing these safeguards, ready availability of habeas corpus may diminish
their sanctity by suggesting to the trial participants that
there may be no need to adhere to those safeguards during
the trial itself.
We must also acknowledge that writs of habeas corpus frequently cost society the right to punish admitted offenders.
Passage of time, erosion of memory, and dispersion of witnesses may render retrial difficult, even impossible. While a
habeas writ may, in theory, entitle the defendant only to retrial, in practice it may reward the accused with complete
freedom from prosecution.
Finally, the Great Writ imposes special costs on our federal
system. The States possess primary authority for defining
and enforcing the criminal law. In criminal trials they also
hold the initial responsibility for vindicating constitutional
rights. Federal intrusions into state criminal trials frustrate
both the States' sovereign power to punish offenders and
their good faith attempts to honor constitutional rights. See
Schneckloth v. Bustamante, 412 U. S. 218, 263-265 (1973)
(POWELL, J., concurring). 32
In Wainwright v. Sykes, we recognized that these costs
are particularly high when a trial default has barred a prisoner from obtaining adjudication of his constitutional claim in
the state courts. In that situation, the trial court has had no
opportunity to correct the defect and avoid problematic retrials. The defendant's counsel, for whatever reasons, has deDuring the last two decades, our constitutional jurisprudence has recognized numerous new rights for criminal defendants. Although some habeas writs correct violations of long-established constitutional rights, others vindicate more novel claims. State courts are understandably
frustrated when they faithfully apply existing constitutional law only to
have a federal court discover, during a § 2254 proceeding, new constitutional commands.
32

•
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tracted from the trial's significance by neglecting to raise a
claim in that forum. 33 The state appellate courts have not
had a chance to mend their own fences and avoid federal intrusion. Issuance of a habeas writ, finally, exacts an extra
charge by undercutting the State's ability to enforce its procedural rules. These considerations supported our Sykes
ruling that, when a procedural default bars state litigation of
a constitutional claim, a state prisoner may not obtain federal
habeas relief absent a showing of cause and actual prejudice.
Respondents urge that we should limit Sykes to cases in
which the constitutional error did not affect the truthfinding
function of the trial. In Sykes itself, for example, the prisoner alleged that the State had violated the rights guaranteed by Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U. S. 436 (1966). While
this defect was serious, it did not affect the determination of
guilt at trial.
We do not believe, however, that the principles of Sykes
lend themselves to this limitation. The costs outlined above
do not depend upon the type of claim raised by the prisoner.
While the nature of a constitutional claim may affect the calculation of cause and actual prejudice, it does not alter the
need to make that threshold showing. We reaffirm, therefore, that any prisoner bringing a constitutional claim to the
federal courthouse after a state procedural default must demonstrate cause and actual prejudice before obtaining relief.
B

Respondents seek cause for their defaults in two circumstances. First, they urge that they could not have known at
the time of their trials that the Due Process Clause addresses
Counsel's default may stem from simple ignorance or the pressures of
trial. We noted in Sykes , however, that a defendant's counsel may deliberately choose to withhold a claim in order to "sandbag"-to gamble on acquittal while saving a dispositive claim in case the gamble doesn't pay off.
See 433 U. S., at 89-90.
33

J,;
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the burden of proving affirmative defenses. Second, they
contend that any objection to Ohio's self-defense instruction
would have been futile since Ohio had long required criminal
defendants to bear the burden of proving this affirmative
defense.
We note at the outset that the futility of presenting an
objection to the state courts cannot alone constitute cause for
a failure to object at trial. If a defendant perceives a constitutional claim and believes it may find favor in the federal
courts, he may not bypass the state courts simply because he
thinks they will be unsympathetic to the claim. 34 Even a
state court that has previously rejected a constitutional argument may decide, upon reflection, that the contention is
valid. Allowing criminal defendants to deprive the state
courts of this opportunity would contradict the principles
supporting Sykes. 35
Respondents' claim, however, is not simply one of futility.
They further allege that, at the time they were tried, they
could not know that Ohio's self-defense instructions raised
constitutional questions. A criminal defendant, they urge,
may not waive constitutional objections unknown at the time
of trial.
We need not decide whether the novelty of a constitutional
claim ever establishes cause for a failure to object. 36 We
See Estelle v. Williams, 425 U.S. 501, 515 (1976) (POWELL, J., concurring) (the policy disfavoring inferred waivers of constitutional rights
"need not be carried to the length of allowing counsel for a defendant deliberately to forgo objection to a curable trial defect, even though he is aware
of the factual and legal basis for an objection, simply because he thought
objection would be futile") ; Myers v. Washington, 646 F . 2d 355, 364 (CA9
1981) (Poole, J., dissenting) (futility cannot constitute cause if it means
simply that a claim was "unacceptable to that particular court at that particular time"), cert. pending, No. 81-1056.
35
In fact, the decision to withhold a known constitutional claim resembles the type of deliberate bypass condemned in Fay v. Noia, 372 U. S. 391
(1963). Since the cause and prejudice standard is more demanding than
Fay's deliberate bypass requirement, see Sykes , supra, at 87, we are confident that perceived futility alone cannot constitute cause.
36
The State stressed at oral argument before this Court that it does not
34

f
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might hesitate to adopt a rule that would require trial counsel
either to exercise extraordinary vision or to object to every
aspect of the proceedings in the hope that some aspect might
mask a latent constitutional claim. On the other hand, later
discovery of a constitutional defect unknown at the time of
trial does not invariably render the original trial fundamentally unfair. 37 These concerns, however, need not detain
us here since respondents' claims were far from unknown at
the time of their trials.
In re Winship, 397 U. S. 358 (1970), decided four-and-onehalf years before the first of respondents' trials, laid the basis
for their constitutional claim. In Winship we held that "the
Due Process Clause protects the accused against conviction
except upon proof beyond a reasonable doubt of every fact
necessary to constitute the crime with which he is charged."
I d., at 364. During the five years following this decision, 38
dozens of defendants relied upon this language to challenge
the constitutionality of rules requiring them to bear a burden
seek such a ruling. Instead, Ohio urges merely that "when the tools are
available to construct the argument, ... you can charge counsel with the
obligation of raising that argument." Transcript at 8-9.
37
See Mackey v. United States, 401 U. S. 667, 67&-702 (1971) (separate
opinion of Harlan, J.); Williams v. United States, 401 U. S. 646, 661>-666
(1971) (MARSHALL, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part);
Hankerson v. North Carolina, 432 U. S. 233, 246-248 (1977) (POWELL, J. ,
concurring in the judgment).
38
Even before Winship, criminal defendants and courts perceived that
placing a burden of proof on the defendant may violate due process. For
example, in Stump v. Bennett, 398 F. 2d 111 (CA8 1968), cert. denied , 393
U. S. 1001 (1968), the Eighth Circuit ruled en bane that an Iowa rule requiring defendants to prove alibis by a preponderance of the evidence violated due process. The court, moreover, observed: "That an oppressive
shifting of the burden of proof to a criminal defendant violates due process
is not a new doctrine within constitutional law." ld., at 122. See also
Johnson v. Bennett, 393 U. S. 253 (1968) (vacating and remanding lower
court decision for reconsideration in light of Stump); State v. Nales, 28
Conn. Supp. 28, 248 A. 2d 242 (1968) (holding that due process forbids requiring defendant to prove "lawful excuse" for possession of housebreaking
tools).
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of proof. 39 In most of these cases, the defendants' claims
countered well-established principles of law. Nevertheless,
numerous courts agreed that the Due Process Clause requires the prosecution to bear the burden of disproving cerSee, e. g., State v. Commenos, 461 S. W. 2d 9 (Mo. 1970) (en bane)
(intent to return allegedly stolen item); Phillips v. State, 86 Nev. 720, 475
P. 2d 671 (1970) (insanity), cert. denied, 403 U. S. 940 (1971); Commonwealth v. O'Neal, 441 Pa. 17, 271 A. 2d 497 (1970) (absence of malice);
Commonwealth v. Vogel, 440 Pa. 1, 268 A. 2d 89 (1970) (insanity), overruled, Commonwealth v. Rose, 457 Pa. 380, 321 A. 2d 880 (1974); Smith v.
Smith, 454 F. 2d 572 (CA5 1971) (alibi), cert. denied, 409 U. S. 885 (1972);
United States v. Braver, 450 F. 2d 799 (CA2 1971) (inducement), cert. denied, 405 U. S. 1064 (1972); Wilbur v. Robbins, 349 F. Supp. 149 (Me.
1972) (heat of passion), aff'd sub nom. Wilbur v. Mullaney, 473 F. 2d 943
(CAl 1973), vacated, 414 U. S. 1139 (1974), on remand, 496 F. 2d 1303
(CA11974), aff'd, 421 U. S. 684 (1975); State v. Cuevas, 53 Haw. 110, 488
P. 2d 322 (1971) (lack of malice aforethought or presence of legal justification); State v. Brown, 163 Conn. 52, 301 A. 2d 547 (1972) (possession of license to deal in drugs), overruled on other grounds, State v. Whistnant,
179 Conn. 576, 427 A. 2d 414 (1980); In re Foss, 10 Cal. 3d 910, 519 P. 2d
1073, 112 Cal. Rptr. 649 (1974) (en bane) (entrapment); Woods v. State, 233
Ga. 347, 211 S. E. 2d 300 (1974) (authority to sell narcotic drugs), appeal
dismissed, 422 U. S. 1002 (1975); State v. Buzynski, 330 A. 2d 422 (Me.
1974) (mental disease); People v. Jordan, 51 Mich. App. 710, 216 N. W. 2d
71 (1974) (absence of intent), disapproved on other grounds, People v.
Johnson, 407 Mich. 196, 284 N. W. 2d 718 (1979); Commonwealth v. Rose,
457 Pa. 380, 321 A. 2d 880 (1974) (intoxication); Retail Credit Co. v. Dade
County, 393 F. Supp. 577 (SD Fla. 1975) (maintenance of reasonable procedures); Fuentes v. State, 349 A. 2d 1 (Del. 1975) (extreme emotional distress), overruled, State v. Moyer, 387 A. 2d 194 (Del. 1978); Henderson v.
State, 234 Ga. 827, 218 S. E. 2d 612 (1975) (self-defense); State v. Grady,
276 Md. 178, 345 A. 2d 436 (1975) (alibi); Evans v. State, 28 Md. App. 640,
349 A. 2d 300 (1975) (absence of malice; further describing in detail that
due process requires prosecution to negate most affirmative defenses, including self-defense), aff'd, 278 Md. 197, 362 A. 2d 629 (1976); State v. Robinson, 48 Ohio App. 2d 197, 356 N. E. 2d 725 (1975) (self-defense), aff'd, 47
Ohio St. 2d 103, 351 N. E. 2d 88 (1976). See also Trimble v. State, 229 Ga.
399, 191 S. E. 2d 857 (1972) (alibi), overruled, Patterson v. State, 233 Ga.
724, 213 S. E. 2d 612 (1975); Grace v. State, 231 Ga. 113, 118, 125-128, 200
S. E. 2d 248, 252, 256-258 (1973) (dissenting opinions) (insanity) .
39
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tain affirmative defenses. 40 In light of this activity, we cannot say that respondents lacked the tools to construct their
constitutional claim. 41
We do not suggest that every astute counsel would have
relied upon Winship to assert the unconstitutionality of a rule
saddling criminal defendants with the burden of proving an
affirmative defense. Every trial presents a myriad of possible claims. Counsel might have chosen to omit or over- ~
looked respondents' due process argument while pursuing
other avenues of defense. We have long recognized, however, that the Constitution guarantees criminal defendants
only a fair trial and a competent attorney. It does not insure
that defense counsel will recognize and raise every conceiv-

l

Several commentators also perceived that Winship might alter traditional burdens of proof for affirmative defenses. E. g., W. LaFave & A.
Scott, Handbook on Criminal Law § 8, pp. 46-51 (1972); The Supreme
Court 1969 Term, 84 Harv. L. Rev. 1, 159 (1970); Student Symposium, 33
Ohio St. L. J., supra n. 2, at 421; Comment, Due Process and Supremacy
as Foundations for the Adequacy Rule: The Remains of Federalism After
Wilbur v. Mullaney, 26 U. Me. L. Rev. 37 (1974).
40
Even those decisions rejecting the defendant's claim, of course, show
that the issue had been perceived by other defendants and that it was a live
one in the courts at the time.
41
Respondent Isaac even had the benefit of our opinion in Mullaney v.
Wilbur, supra, decided three months before his trial. In Mullaney we invalidated a Maine practice requiring criminal defendants to negate malice
by proving that they acted in the heat of passion. We thus explicitly acknowledged the link between Winship and constitutional limits on assignment of the burden of proof. Cf. Lee v. Missouri, 439 U. S. 461, 462
(1979) (per curiam) (suggesting that defendants who failed, after Taylor v.
Louisiana, 419 U. S. 522 (1975), to object to the exclusion of women from
juries must show cause for the failure).
Respondents argue at length that, before the Ohio Supreme Court's decision in State v. Robinson, supra, they did not know that Ohio Rev. Code
Ann. § 2901.05(A) changed the traditional burden of proof. Ohio's interpretation of§ 2901.05(A), however, is relevant only to claims that we reject
independently of respondents' procedural default. See supra, at 10-12;
n. 25, supra.
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able constitutional claim. Where the basis of a constitutional
claim is available, and other defense counsel have perceived
and litigated that claim, the demands of comity and finality
counsel against labelling alleged unawareness of the objection
as cause for a procedural default. 42

c
Respondents, finally, urge that we should replace or supplement the cause-and-prejudice standard with a plain-error
inquiry. We rejected this argument when pressed by a federal prisoner, see United States v. Frady, No. 80-1595, and
find it no more compelling here. The federal courts apply a
plain-error rule for direct review of federal convictions.
Fed. Rule Crim. Proc. 52(b). Federal habeas challenges to
state convictions, however, entail greater finality problems
and special comity concerns. We remain convinced that the
burden of justifying federal habeas relief for state prisoners
is "greater than the showing required to establish plain error
on direct appeal." Henderson v. Kibbe, 431 U. S. 145, 154
(1977); United States v. Frady, supra, at - - . 43
42
Respondents resist this conclusion by noting that Hankerson v. North
Carolina, 432 U. S. 233, 243 (1977), gave Mullaney v. Wilbur, the opinion
explicitly recognizing Winship's effect on affirmative defenses, "complete
retroactive effect." Hankerson itself, however, acknowledged the distinction between the retroactive availability of a constitutional decision and the
right to claim that availability after a procedural default. JUSTICE WHITE's
majority opinion forthrightly suggested that the States "may be able to insulate past convictions [from the effect of Mullaney] by enforcing the normal and valid rule that failure to object to a jury instruction is a waiver of
any claim of error." 432 U. S., at 244 n. 8. In this case we accept the
force of that language as applied to defendants tried after Winship.
Since we conclude that these respondents lacked cause for their default,
we do not consider whether they also suffered actual prejudice. Respondents urge that their prejudice was so great that it should permit relief
even in the absence of cause. Sykes, however, stated these criteria in the
conjunctive and the facts of this case do not persuade us to depart from
that approach.
43
Respondents bolster their plain-error contention by observing that
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Contrary to respondents' assertion, moreover, a plain-error standard is unnecessary to correct miscarriages of justice. The terms "cause" and "actual prejudice" are not rigid
concepts; they take their meaning from the principles of comity and finality discussed above. In appropriate cases
those principles must yield to the imperative of a fundamentally unjust incarceration. Since we are confident that
victims of a fundamental miscarriage of justice will meet the
cause-and-prejudice standard, see Wainwright v. Sykes,
supra, at 91; id., at 94-97 (STEVENS, J., concurring), we decline to adopt the more vague inquiry suggested by the words
"plain error."
IV
Close analysis of respondents' habeas petitions reveals only
one colorable constitutional claim. Because respondents
failed to comply with Ohio's procedures for raising that contention, and because they have not demonstrated cause for
the default, they are barred from asserting that claim under
28 U. S. C. § 2254. The judgments of the Court of Appeals
are reversed and remanded for proceedings consistent with
this opinion.
So ordered.

Ohio will overlook a procedural default if the trial defect constituted plain
error. Ohio, however, has declined to exercise this discretion to review
the type of claim pressed here. Seen. 27, supra. If Ohio had exercised
its discretion to consider respondents' claim, then their initial default
would no longer block federal review. See Mullaney v. Wilbur, supra, at
688 n. 7; County Court of Ulster County v. Allen, 442 U. S. 140, 147-154
(1979). Our opinions, however, make clear that the States have the primary responsibility to interpret and apply their plain error-rules. Certainly we should not rely upon a state plain-error rule when the State has
refused to apply that rule to the very sort of claim at issue.
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victed after a jury trial and sentenced during the following
September. 1 While his conviction was on appeal in the Ohio
Court of Appeals, the Ohio Supreme Court decided State v.
Robinson, 47 Ohio St. 2d 103, 351 N. E. 2d 88 (July 1976),
which construed Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 2901.05(A) (effective
January 1, 1974) to require the prosecution to bear the burden of persuasion, beyond a reasonable doubt, with respect
to an affirmative defense of self-defense raised by the defendant. The Ohio Court of Appeals affirmed Isaac's conviction
in February 1977. 2 The Ohio Supreme Court dismissed
Isaac's appeal in July 1977. 3 On the same day, the Ohio Supreme Court decided State v. Humphries, 51 Ohio St. 2d 95,
364 N. E. 2d 1354. That case declared Robinson retroactive
to the effective date of § 2901.05(A), but only partially: It
held that in order to gain the retroactive benefits of the Robinson decision, a defendant tried before a jury must have
preserved his claim by objection at trial to the allocation of
the affirmative-defense burden of proof, while a bench-trial
defendant could have made the same objection as late as in
the court of appeals, and the objection would still have been
preserved. 51 Ohio St. 2d, at 102-103, 364 N. E. 2d, at
1359.
Isaac filed his habeas petition in the United States District
Court for the Southern District of Ohio in March 1978. 4 The
asserted ground for relief was "denial of due process of law,"
in that
"The trial court charged petitioner had the burden of
proving self-defense. After conviction and during the
first appeal the Ohio Supreme Court declared the instructions to be prejudicial error under Robinson. This
1
App. 2; Appendix to Brief in No. 78--3488, Isaac v. Engle (CA6), pp. 2,
3-4.
2
App. 6.
3
App. 13.
' Appendix to Brief in No. 78--3488, Isaac v. E ngle (CA6), p. 18.
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case was immediately raised to the Appellate Court.
They held any error was waived. The Ohio Supreme
Court then held Robinson retroactive. Petitioner had
raised retroactivity in its leave to appeal and was denied
leave to appeal the same day Humphries was decided declaring retroactivity. The Ohio Supreme Court refuses
to give relief despite its own pronouncement. The holding of the court is contrary to the Supreme Court of the
United States in regard to proving self-defense." 5
Isaac's memorandum in support of his habeas petition made it
plain that his claim was that Humphries' selective retroactive
application of the Robinson rule denied him due process of
law. 6 It is obvious, of course, that it was simply impossible
to make this claim before Humphries was decided, in July
1977, on the same day that Isaac's direct appeals in the state
court system were finally rejected.
Ohio Rev. Code Ann. §2953.21(A) provides for postconviction relief under certain circumstances:
"Any person convicted of a criminal offense ... claiming
that there was such a denial or infringement of his rights
as to render the judgment void or voidable under the
Ohio Constitution or the Constitution of the United .
States, may file a verified petition at any time in the
court which imposed sentence, stating the grounds of relief relied upon, and asking the court to vacate or set
aside the judgment or sentence or to grant other appropriate relief."
By applying the doctrine of res judicata to postconviction petitions, the Ohio Supreme Court has allowed relief under this
procedure only under limited circumstances: Constitutional
issues can be raised under § 2953.21(A) only when they could
not have been raised at trial or on appeal. State v. Perry, 10
6
6

Id., at p. 21 (emphasis added).
!d., at p. 25.
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Ohio St. 2d 175, 180-181, 226 N. E. 2d 104, 108 (1967); see
Keener v. Ridenour, 594 F. 2d 581, 589-591 (CA6 1979) (construing scope of Ohio postconviction remedy); Riley v.
Havener, 391 F. Supp. 1177, 1179-1180 (ND Ohio 1974)
(same). But Isaac's claim is manifestly of the sort that could
not have been raised at trial or on appeal, for the claim only
came into existence on the day that Isaac's last appeal was
rejected. Consequently, state postconviction remedies are
available to Isaac and have not been exhausted.
I draw three conclusions from the foregoing account, all of
which to my mind follow ineluctably from the undisputed
facts of this case. First, Isaac's h~eas petition should have
been dismissed for his failure to exhaust available state remedies. See Picard v. Connor, 404 U. S. 270 (1971), where we
emphasized that
"the federal claim must be fairly presented to the state
courts. . . . Only if the state courts have had the first
opportunity to hear the claim sought to be vindicated in a
federal habeas proceeding does it make sense to speak of
the exhaustion of state remedies." 404 U. S., at
27&--276.
In the present case, petitioner Engle responded to Isaac's petition by raising the issue of Isaac's failure to exhaust. 7
Therefore the Court of Appeals clearly erred, under Picard
and our whole line of exhaustion precedents, in granting habeas relief to Isaac instead of requiring exhaustion. The
proper disposition of Isaac's case is thus to reverse and remand with instructions to dismiss on exhaustion grounds.
The Court's failure to order such a disposition is incomprehensible: Less than a month ago this Court emphatically
reaffirmed the exhaustion doctrine, and indeed extended it,
announcing a requirement of "total exhaustion" for habeas
petitions. Rose v. Lundy,-- U. S. --(March 3, 1982). 8
' I d., at pp. 35-36.
"A rigorously enforced total exhaustion rule will encourage state pris-

8
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But today it finds the nostrum of "cause and prejudice" more
attractive, and so Rose v. Lundy is not applied. Sic transit
gloria! In less than a month the bloom is off the Rose.
My second conclusion is that Isaac simply committed no
"procedural default" in failing to raise at trial or on direct appeal the claim that appears in his habeas petition. That
claim did not exist at any time during Isaac's trial or direct
appeal. Thus the essential factual predicate for an application of Wainwright v. Sykes, supra, is completely absent in
Isaac's case. Sykes involved a habeas petitioner who had
failed to object in a timely manner to the admission of his confession at trial. 433 U. S., at 86-87. Given that factual
predicate, Sykes addressed the question of whether federal
habeas review should be barred absent a showing of "cause"
for the procedural default of failing to object, and a further
showing of "prejudice" resulting from the admission of the
confession. !d., at 87, 90-91. But in the case before us, respondent Isaac could not have made any objection, timely or
otherwise, at trial or on appeal. Thus the application of
Sykes is completely and manifestly erroneous in this case. 9
My last conclusion is that the Court is so intent upon applying Sykes to Isaac's case that it plays , Procrust~ with his
claim. In order to bring Isaac's claim within the ambit of
oners to seek full relief first from the state courts, thus giving those courts
the first opportunity to review all claims of constitutional error. As the
number of prisoners who exhaust all of their federal claims increases, state
courts may become increasing familiar with and hospitable toward federal
constitutional issues." Slip op., at 10.
'The panel opinion of the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth
Circuit in Isaac's case reached this same conclusion. The panel correctly
read Isaac's petition as presenting the question of "whether the decision of
the Supreme Court of Ohio to withhold from petitioner the benefits of Section 2901.05(A), as established in State v. Robinson, for failure to comply
with Ohio's contemporaneous objection rule was a deprivation of due process." 646 F. 2d 1122, 1124 (1980). As to this question, the panel accurately concluded that "Wainwright v. Sykes, supra, is not applicable to ...
[Isaac's] petition." Id., at 1127.

I
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Sykes, the Court first characterizes his petition as "complex."
Ante, at 9. 10 Then, without quoting the claim as it actually
appeared in Isaac's petition, the Court delineates a "colorable
constitutional claim" nowhere to be found in the petition. As
the Court recasts it, Isaac's claim is as follows:
[T]he crime[] charged against [Isaac] require[s] a showing of purposeful or knowing behavior. These terms,
according to [Isaac], imply a degree of culpability that is
absent when a person acts in self-defense. . . . Self-defense, [Isaac] urge[s], negates ... [essential] elements
of criminal behavior. Therefore, once the defendant
raises the possibility of self-defense, [Isaac] contend[s]
that the State must disprove that defense as part of its
task of establishing guilty mens rea, voluntariness, and
unlawfulness. The Due Process Clause, according to
[Isaac's] interpretation of Winship, Mullaney, and Patterson, forbids the States from disavowing any portion of
this burden." Ante, at 12-13.
This new-modeled claim bears no resemblance to the claim
actually made by Isaac in his habeas petition. See supra, at
2-3. 11 But by virtue of this exercise in juristic revisionism,
the Court puts itself in position to find that "Isaac's" claim
was "forfeited before the state courts," ante, at 16--no difficult task, since the claim is wholly imagined by the Court itself-thus enabling the Court to reach its clearly sought goal
of deciding "whether the principles articulated in Wainwright
v. Sykes, supra, bar consideration of the claim in a federal
habeas proceeding." Ante, at 14. Unsurprisingly, the
10
The full text of Isaac's claim appears supra, at pp. 2--3. It is plain that
the Court's claim of "complexity" is merely a smokescreen, behind which
the Court feels free to reshape Isaac's claim.
"It does bear some resemblance to Isaac's claim as construed by the plurality opinion of the Court of Appeals en bane below. 646 F. 2d 1129,
1133-1136 (1980). But the plurality's construction was simply incorrect,
and this Court should correct such errors, not perpetuate them.

.'
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Court's bottom line is that Isaac's fictive claim is indeed
barred by Sykes. In short, the Court reshapes respondent
Isaac's actual claim into a form that enables it to foreclose all
federal review, when as plainly pleaded the claim was unexhausted, thus calling for the dismissal of Isaac's petition for
habeas relief. The Court's analysis is completely result-oriented, and represents a noteworthy exercise in the very jydic'iiiractivi~ that the Court so deprecates in other contexts.

-

II
For the reasons stated above, I conclude that in its unseemly rush to reach the merits of Isaac's case, the Court1la':
ignored settled law respecting the exhaustion of state remedies. But lest it be thought that my disagreement with today's decision is confined to that point alone, I turn to the
Court's treatment of the merits of the cases before us. I
continue to believe that the "deliberate bypass" standard announced in Fay v. Noia, 372 U. S. 391 (1963), is the only sensible rule to apply in habeas cases such as respondents'. I
adhere to m,x dissent in Wainwright v. Sykes, supra, in
which l termeJ tlie llcause-and-prejudice" standard adopted
in that case "a mere house of cards whose foundation has escaped any systematic inspection." 433 U. S., at 99-100, n.
1. The Court has now begun to furnish its house of cardsand the furniture is as jerry-built as the house itself.

A
Sykes did not give the terms "cause" and "prejudice" any
"precise content," but promised that "later cases" would provide such content. 433 U. S., at 91. Today the nature of
that content becomes distressingly apparent. The Court
still refuses to say what "cause" is: And I predict that on the
Court's present view it will prove easier for a camel to go
through the eye of a needle than for a state prisoner to show
"cause." But on the other hand, the Court is more than eager to say what "cause" is not: And in doing so, the Court is

~~~-

~b;J''

~~ltV
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supported neither by common sense nor by the very reasons
offered in Sykes for adoption of the "cause and prejudice"
standard in the first place.
According to the Court, "cause" is not demonstrated when
the Court "cannot say that [habeas petitioners] lacked the
tools to construct their constitutional claim," ante, at 23,
however primitive those tools were and thus however inchoate the claim was when petitioners were in the state courts.
The Court concludes, after several pages of tortuous reasoning, ante, at 21-23, that respondents in the present cases did
indeed have "the tools" to make their constitutional claims.
This conclusion is reached by the sheerest inference: It is
based on citations to other cases in other jurisdictions, where
other defendants raised other claims assertedly similar to
those that respondents "could" have raised. Ante, at 21-22
& n. 39. To hold the present respondents to such a high
standard of foresight is tantamount to a complete rejection of
the notion that there is a point before which a claim is so inchoate that there is adequate "cause" for the failure to raise
it. In thus rejecting inchoateness as "cause," the Court
overlooks the fact that none of the rationales used in Sykes to
justify adoption of the cause-and-prejudice standard can justify today's definition of "cause."
Sykes adopted the cause-and-prejudice standard in order
to accord "greater respect" to state contemporaneousobjection rules than was assertedly given by Fay v. Noia,
supra. 433 U. S., at 88. The Court then offered a number
of reasons why contemporaneous-objection rules should be
given such greater respect:
(1) "A contemporaneous objection enables the record
to be made with respect to the constitutional claim when
the recollections of witnesses are freshest, not a year
later in a federal habeas proceeding." 433 U. S., at 88.
(2) A contemporaneous objection "enables the judge
who observed the demeanor of those witnesses to make
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the factual determinations necessary for properly deciding the federal constitutional question." Ibid.
(3) "A contemporaneous-objection rule may lead to
the exclusion of evidence objected to, thereby making a
major contribution to finality in criminal litigation."
Ibid.
(4) The Fay v. Noia rule "may encourage 'sandbagging' on the part of defense lawyers, who may take their
chances on a verdict of not guilty in a state trial court
with the intent to raise their constitutional claims in a
federal habeas court if their initial gamble does not pay
off." I d., at 89.
(5) A contemporaneous objection rule "encourages the
result that [criminal trials] be as free of error as possible." Id., at 90.
None of these rationales has any force in the present case.
The first three reasons are valid, if at all, only in the particular context of objections to the admission of evidence such as
were at issue in Sykes. As for the "sandbagging" rationale,
dutifully repeated by today's Court, ante, at 19, n. 33, that
was fully answered in my Sykes dissent: 12 That argument still
433 U.S., at 103-104 & n. 5:
"Under the regime of collateral review recognized since the days of Brov.m
v. Allen [344 U. S. 443 (1953)], and enforced by the Fay bypass test, no
rational lawyer would risk the 'sandbagging' feared by the Court. . . . In
brief, the defense lawyer would face two options: (1) He could elect to
present his constitutional claims to the state courts in a proper fashion. If
the state trial court is persuaded that a constitutional breach has occurred,
the remedies dictated by the Constitution would be imposed, the defense
would be bolstered, and the prosecution accordingly weakened, perhaps
precluded altogether. If the state court rejects the properly tendered
claims, the defense has lost nothing: Appellate review before the state
courts and federal habeas consideration are preserved. (2) He could elect
to 'sandbag.' This presumably means, first, that he would hold back the
presentation of his constitutional claim to the trial court, thereby increasing the likelihood of a conviction since the prosecution would be able to
12
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"offends common sense," and does not become less offensive
by sententious repetition. And the final reason-relied on
again today, ante, at 17-18---is plainly irrelevant to a case involving inchoate constitutional claims. Such claims are ex
hypothesis so embryonic that only the extraordinarily foresighted criminal defendant will raise them. It is completely
implausible to expect that the raising of such claims will predictably-or even occasionally-make trials more "free of
error."
B
The Court justifies its result today with several additional
reasons-or, rather, · ~entiments'"in reasons' clothing.- We
are told, ante, at 16--1 r,tnat "the Great Wnt entails significant costs. Collateral review of a conviction extends the ordeal of trial for both society and the accused." But we are
not told why the accused would consider it an "ordeal" to go
to federal court in order to attempt to vindicate his constitutional rights. Nor are we told why society should be eager
to ensure the finality of a conviction arguably tainted by unreviewed constitutional error directly affecting the
truthfinding function of the trial. I simply fail to understand
how allowance of a habeas hearing "entails significant costs"
to anyone under the circumstances of the cases before us.
In a similar vein, we are told, ante, at 18, that "We must
also acknowledge that writs of habeas corpus frequently cost
present evidence that, while arguably constitutionally deficient, may be
highly prejudicial to the defense. Second, he would thereby have forfeited
all state review and remedies with respect to these claims (subject to whatever 'plain error' rule is available). Third, to carry out his scheme, he
would now be compelled to deceive the federal habeas court and to convince the judge that he did not 'deliberately bypass' the state procedures.
If he loses on this gamble, all federal review would be barred, and his
'sandbagging' would have resulted in nothing but the forfeiture of all judicial review of his client's claims. The Court, without substantiation, apparently believes that a meaningful number of lawyers are induced into option 2 by Fay. I do not. That belief simply offends common sense."
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society the right to punish admitted offenders." I for one
will acknowledge nothing of the sort. Respondents were all
convicted after trials in which they allege that the burden of
proof respecting their affirmative defenses was imposed upon
them in an unconstitutional manner. Thus they are not "admitted" offenders at all: If they had been tried with the
assertedly proper allocation of the burden of proof, then they
might very well have been acquitted. Further, it is sheer
demagoguery to blame the "offender" for the logistical and
temporal difficulties arising from retrial: If the writ of habeas
corpus has been granted, then it is at least as reasonable to
blame the State for having prosecuted the first trial "in violation of the Constitution or laws ... of the United States," 28
U. S. C. § 2254(a).
Finally, we are told, ante, at 18 & n. 32, that
"the Great Writ imposes special costs on our federal system. . . . Federal intrusions into state criminal trials
frustrate the States' sovereign power to punish offel.lders and their good faith attempts to honor constitutional
rights. . . . State courts are understandably frustrated
when they faithfully apply existing constitutional law
only to have a federal court discover, during a§ 2254 proceeding, new constitutional commands."
Once again, the Court drags a red herring across its path. I
hope that the Court Torgets only momentarily that "the
States' sovereign power" is limited by the Constitution of the
United States: that the "intrusion" complained of is that of
the supreme law of the land. But it must be reason for deep
concern when this Court forgets, as it certainly does today,
that "it is a constitution we are expounding," 13 and that it is
inimical to the principle of federal constitutional supremacy
to accede to state courts' "frustration" at the requirements of
federal constitutional law as it is interpreted in an evolving
13

M'Culloch v. Maryland, 4 Wheat. 316, 407 (1819).

·.
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society. Sykes promised that its cause-and-prejudice standard would "not prevent a federal habeas court from adjudicating for the first time the federal constitutional claim of a
defendant who in the absence of such an adjudication will be
the victim of a miscarriage of justice." 433 U. S., at 91.
Today's decision, with its unvarnished hostility to the assertion of federal constitutional claims, starkly reveals the emptiness of that promise.
~

c
Finally, there is the issue of the Court's extension of the
Sykes standard "to cases in which the constitutional error
... affect[s] the truthfinding function of the trial." Ante, at
19. The Court concedes, ibid., that Sykes itself involved the
violation of the habeas petitioner's Miranda rights, and that
although "this defect was serious, it did not affect the determination of guilt at trial." But despite the fact that the
present cases admittedly do involve a defect affecting the
determination of guilt, the Court refuses to limit Sykes and
thus bars federal review: "We do not believe . . . that the
principles of Sykes lend themselves to this limitation." Ibid.
In so holding, the Court ignores the manifest differences between claims that affect the truthfinding function of the trial
and claims that do not.
The Court proclaimed in Stone v. Powell, 428 U. S. 465,
490 (1976), "the ultimate question of guilt or innocence ...
should be the central concern in a criminal proceeding." A
defendant's Fourth Amendment rights, see Stone, or his
Miranda rights, see Sykes, may arguably be characterized as
"crucially different from many other constitutional rights,"
Kaufman v. United States, 394 U.S. 217, 237 (1969) (Black,
J., dissenting), in that evidence procured in violation of those
rights has not ordinarily been rendered untrustworthy by the
means of its procurement. But a defendant's right to a trial
at which the burden of proof has been constitutionally allo-

•.
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cated can never be violated without rendering the entire trial
result untrustworthy. "In all kinds of litigation it is plain
that where the burden of proof lies may be decisive of the
outcome," Speiser v. Randall, 357 U. S. 513, 525 (1958), and
petitioners in the present cases concede as much, Brief of Petitioners 22. As Justice Harlan noted in In re Winship, 397
u. s. 358 (1970),
"If, for example, the standard of proof for a criminal trial
were a preponderance of the evidence rather than proof
beyond a reasonable doubt, there would be a smaller risk
of factual errors that result in freeing guilty persons, but
a far greater risk of factual errors that result in convicting the innocent." 397 U. S., at 371 (concurring
opinion).
Where, as here, the burden was placed on respondents,
rather than on the prosecution, to prove their affirmative defenses by a preponderance of the evidence, the risk of convicting the innocent is even greater than in Justice Harlan's
example. And if this allocation of the burden of proof was
erroneous, then that error constitutes a denial of due process
of intolerable proportions. We have recognized the truth of
this proposition in numerous precedents. In Ivan V. v. City
of New York, 407 U. S. 203 (1972), we held our earlier decision in Winship to be fully retroactive, stating that
"'Where the major purpose of a new constitutional
doctrine is to overcome an aspect of a criminal trial that
substantially impairs its truth-finding function and so
raises serious questions about the accuracy of guilty verdicts in past trials, the new rule has been given complete
retroactive effect. Neither good-faith reliance by state
or federal authorities on prior constitutional law or accepted practice, nor severe impact on the administration
of justice has sufficed to require prospective application
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in these circumstances.' Williams v. United States, 401
U. S. 646, 653 (1971). See Adams v. Illinois, 405 U. S.
278, 280 (1972); Roberts v. Russell, 392 U. S. 293, 295
(1968)." 407 U. 8., at 204 (emphasis added). 14
In sum, this Court has heretofore adhered to the principle
that, "In the administration of criminal justice, our society
imposes almost the entire risk of error upon itself," because
"the interests of the defendant are of such magnitude."
Addington v. Texas, 441 U. S. 418, 423-424 (1979). In the
context of the cases before us today, this principle means that
a habeas claim that a mistake was made in assigning the risk
of error cannot be cavalierly dismissed as just another "type
of claim raised by the prisoner," ante, at 19. In my view,
the Sykes standard is misguided and insupportable in any
context. But if it is to be suffered to exist at all, it should be
limited to the arguable peripheries of the trial process: It
should not be allowed to insulate from all judicial review all
violations of the most fundamental rights of the accused.
I dissent.

We later relied on Ivan V. in holding that our decision in Mullaney
must be applied retroactively. Hankerson v. North Carolina, 432 U. S.
233, 242-244 (1977).
14
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